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ABSTRACT

PATTERNS OF DISSAVING AMONG U.S. ELDERS

June 2014

Deborah Gray, B.S., University of Massachusetts Amherst
M.B.A., Brandeis University
M.S., University of Massachusetts Boston
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts Boston

Directed by Associate Professor Ellen A. Bruce

This paper examined patterns of decumulation and the role that health events and
marital disruption play in forming those patterns. Study data were drawn from six
biennial waves of the HRS (1998 - 2008), and merged RAND HRS data files for the
period 1998 – 2008. The a priori expectation was that there will be variation in
drawdown strategies households employ. Findings suggest that patterns of dissaving are
heterogeneous. The five most prevalent patterns were discussed. Households
predominantly transitioned between oversaving and overspending. Households are
expected to have a goal of on target spending therefore the observed cycle’s dissaving
will influence the next cycle’s draw down rate in an attempt to maintain a sustainable
drawdown rate. Markov model results suggest that households do recalibrate their
depletion rate as a function of their last depletion rate. This study hypothesized that the
onset of a health condition or a spouse’s admission to a nursing home would be
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associated with an excessive decumulation of assets. These hypotheses were unsupported
by the research. Marital transitions as predictors of decumulation were only partially
borne out by the results. Divorce was also expected to increase the likelihood of
overspender however this relationship was not significant. Loss of spouse was associated
with an increased likelihood of overspending. One of the major contributions of this
study is the identification of patterns of dissaving in retirement. Various life course,
demographic and decumulation factor variables were determinants of these patterns.
Overall results suggest that elders have a difficult time managing to an on target
drawdown. This study concludes with a national decumulation policy directive outline.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The creation and implementation of a sound retirement financial management
plan can be a daunting task. As described by a retirement expert:
“… Consider what would have to happen for it to work for you. First, figure
out when you and your spouse will be laid off or be too sick to work. Second,
figure out when you will die. Third, understand that you need to save 7 percent of
every dollar you earn. (Didn’t start doing that when you were 25 and you are 55
now? Just save 30 percent of every dollar.) Fourth, earn at least 3 percent above
inflation on your investments, every year. (Easy. Just find the best funds for the
lowest price and have them optimally allocated.) Fifth, do not withdraw any funds
when you lose your job, have a health problem, get divorced, buy a house or send
a kid to college. Sixth, time your retirement account withdrawals so the last cent
is spent the day you die.” -Ghilarducci, 2012.
This dissertation will focus on dissaving by the aging population. Specifically, it
will examine patterns of dissaving and whether or not assets are decumulated over time at
a sustainable rate, the association between health status and risk of excessive wealth
depletion, as well as how changes to family composition affect dissaving.
According to Pew Research projections (2011) as of December 2010, 13% of the
population is 65 or older. This will increase to 18% by the year 2030. For those who
reach the age of 65, the average life expectancy is 18.5 years; many of these individuals
will survive to considerably higher ages (US Census Bureau, 2010a). Outliving their
assets is one of the most serious risks elders face.
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Spending in later years so that one does not outlive their assets is a function of
assets, expenses, income and lifespan. Many components affect these factors including
race/ethnicity and health status. Ethnic diversity in the population is expected to shift as
well. It is estimated that the percent of the population that is Black will increase 3%
while those reporting Hispanic ethnicity will increase by 13%. The percent of the
population which self-identifies as White will decline 10% over this time (Census
Bureau, 2010b).
A recent study from the Centers for Disease Control (2009) finds that while
overall Americans are living longer, active lives, relative to their younger peers seniors
are still at increased risk for disease and disability. This can result in increased out of
pocket costs for healthcare and long-term care. Johnson and Mommaerts (2010) finds
that the median out of pocket healthcare cost for seniors is $2,600. These costs are
expected to increase more than 200% by 2040. As a result, 70% of those in the bottom
two quintiles of the income distribution will find that health care costs will account for
more than 20% of their consumption costs. Research suggests that racial and ethnic
minorities are in poorer health than Whites (US Department of Health and Human
Services, 2010; Federal Interagency Forum on Aging-Related Statistics, 2008; Mead et
al., 2008), thus increasing their financial burden relative to Whites.
Elders receive income from a variety of sources thus there are complex tradeoffs
to consider when devising an income stream in later life. For example, in addition to
deciding when to receive Social Security and pension plan benefits, an individual must
decide how to draw down their owned assets such as savings in retirement accounts
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(IRAs, 401(k)s, etc.), a home, land, and regular savings (non-tax-deferred retirement
accounts).
Consumption in later life can be funded from assets as well as income. Many
have recommended that seniors target a 70% replacement rate – the post-retirement to
pre-retirement income ratio (Munnell & Soto, 2005). On average, it is expected that
Social Security will replace 40% of pre-retirement earnings (US Social Security
Statement, 2010). To bridge this gap, it is expected that during their working years
individuals will accumulate wealth to convert to a stream of income in their later years.
However, many households have not saved adequately (Meschede et al., 2010; Haveman
et al., 2005; Munnell, 2005).
Their financial security in later years is further jeopardized on several fronts; by
the recent housing and financial market turmoil as well as rising healthcare costs.
According to Butrica and Issa (2010) retirement account balances have fluctuated wildly
over the past 5 years. Between Q3 2007 and Q1 2009 these accounts lost 32% of their
peak valuation. During Q1-Q3 2010 retirement accounts lost then regained 5% of their
value. Bosworth and Smart (2009) finds that the percent of homeowners who reported a
negative home equity increased fifteen fold between 2007 and 2009. While elders did
not experience as drastic a decrease as younger cohorts (they had built more equity over
time), they have less time relative to younger age groups to recoup their equity loss.
Since many elders will enter their later years with less than optimal savings it is
important to understand how they decumulate, or spend down, the assets intended to
support their late life consumption needs.
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The conceptual model employed in this study posits that elders will spend down
at a rate so that their assets are completely depleted when they die, not before. That
assumption means that the person leaves no bequest to their offspring. This is referred to
in the dissertation as “on target” spending. However, households may manage their
finances in a manner which puts them at risk for outliving their assets (overspending) or
under consuming and leave an unintended legacy bequest (oversaving). The potential
problems resulting from overspending or oversaving are discussed in the following pages.
Overspending
Households that decumulate too quickly run the risk of exhausting their savings
before they die. While the majority of elders receive Social Security benefits (nine out of
ten individuals aged 65+) the average monthly benefit is only $1,269. Approximately
53% of married couples and 74% of single elders rely on Social Security for 50% or more
of their monthly income. Almost one third of elders (23% of married couples and 46% of
unmarried elders) receive 90% or more of their income from this program (Social
Security Administration, 2013). According to the Elder Economic Security Standard
Index, the average Social Security benefit is not sufficient to cover daily living expenses
(National Economic Security Standard Index, 2012). Elders forced to live on inadequate
monthly incomes will face consumption choices and tradeoffs. Asset depletion levels
will have to be considered from the perspective of meeting current consumption needs
versus preserving capital over their remaining life expectancy. Therefore capital run
down rates are an important consideration for elders who have assets. Regardless of the
funding decision, a potential for diminished quality of life in the future exists.
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An increase in elder’s outliving their assets could result in a greater demand on
government programs and services. This potential demand needs to be considered in the
context of the country’s fiscal climate. The Congressional Budget Office’s September
2013 (Congress of the United States, 2013) report states that the federal debt is now 73
percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Gross domestic product is the country’s
economic output and represents the ratio between income and debt. If current policies
remain in place, by 2038 federal debt will reach 100 percent of GDP.
While overspending elders will bear the brunt of the consequences, there are
societal impacts as well. Among these are the need for rent subsidies, affordable
housing, and healthcare subsidies (National Economic Security Standard Index, 2012).
Medicaid provides health coverage to 4.6 million seniors who meet income requirements;
many of these individuals are also eligible for Medicare (“Seniors & Medicare and
Medicaid Enrollees,” 2014). Medicaid helps low income Medicare beneficiaries cover
out of pocket costs, prescriptions, and extended nursing home stays. An increase to
Medicaid eligibility will further stress government finances.
Oversaving
Oversaving also has downsides to both the individual and society. Elders’
economic contributions to their local economy are often overlooked; instead studies tend
to focus on the costs to society (i.e. health care, entitlement programs). However,
spending by the elderly generates income and employment in their local geographic
region. According to Goldsmith and Angvik (2006), elders spend most of their money
locally which leads to job creation. Retirees generate jobs across the wage spectrum; low
wage (trades and services) as well as high paying (health care) jobs. These jobs are year
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round, unlike seasonal demands from tourists for example. They also broaden a state’s
tax base. They estimated that in Alaska retiree spending fuels nearly 4% of the state’s
wage and salary jobs.
Shields, Stallman and Deller (2002) in their study of relocating elders finds that
500 new low income elderly households results in 156 jobs (0.2 jobs per household
member) while the addition of 500 high income household will create 810 jobs (0.7 jobs
per household member). The authors attribute the difference in employment impact to
larger spending by the high income households.
Furthermore, receipt of government benefits provides economic gains for the
community. Gallardo and Myles (2011) reports that the $675 billion in Social Security
benefits paid in 2009 generated $1.2 trillion of economic activity.
Finally, Rovner (2013) estimates that those 68+ as of 2013 make 25% of all
charitable donations. Those donations will exceed $27 million in 2013 alone. Thus if
elders unnecessarily curtail their spending the local economy as well as the non-profit
community (and those relying on its services in the near term) could suffer.
Oversaving also has implications for the quality of senior’s life. John Hancock’s
2013 survey reports that the average cost of adult day care is $71 a day ($18,460
annually), and a home health aide is $19/hourly ($29,640 annually). While these
amounts could represent a sizeable portion of an elder person’s income, the use of paid
in-home non-medical care is correlated with a lower rate of doctor visits and savings on
health care expenditures overall (Home Instead Senior Care, 2010). Ironically, it appears
that by creating an overly frugal dissaving plan, elders may (at least where their health is
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concerned) be placing themselves at risk for greater health care spending in the future, as
well as lowering their current standard of living.
Challenges to Creating a Sustainable Dissaving Plan
The creation of a sustainable dissaving plan would be a logical first step for
individuals entering this phase of wealth management. An “ideal” decumulation plan
would include annuities for a guaranteed lifetime of income, preferably sufficient to
finance the desired lifestyle. For those wishing to leave a bequest, annuities with riders
that have a death benefit can be purchased. Alternatively, income from the annuity could
be used to purchase life insurance (Haithcock, 2013). Some amount of funds should
remain liquid, to cover unforeseen expenditures. Finally, if asset levels allow, purchasing
long term care insurance to cover future medical costs is advisable. As one advisor asks
his clients regarding insurance rates, “…is it easier to come up with $500 a month or
$6,000 or 7,000.” (McCarthy, 2013).
However, developing a drawdown plan is complicated due to the structure and
number of potential sources of income. Individuals can have a combination of taxable,
tax deferred, and tax free accounts in their portfolios at the time of decumulation. These
accounts can be held by one or more individuals in the household, further complicating
the creation of a draw down stream which maximizes income. Long and short term gains
must also be factored into the distribution process. Income tax and state tax rates figure
into this process as well. Tax implications vary dependent upon how a particular product
(i.e. annuities) was purchased. Annuities purchased with pre-tax dollars, after tax dollars
and nonqualified retirement accounts are all subject to different tax laws (Brown and
Mitchell, 2001).
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Furthermore, the number of accounts held also adds a layer of complexity to this
exercise. A recent Vanguard study of US investors found that 21% of households had
three asset accounts; 45% owned six or fewer accounts, and 18% had ten or more
accounts. These numbers could be underestimating the total number of accounts; reports
could have been based on asset types not overall number. For example, if respondents
held two or more IRA accounts with the same firm it is possible that they reported
owning only one account.
A sound knowledge of financial principles is required for any individual
attempting to optimally manage their portfolio in the dissaving phase. However, research
suggests that financial literacy is low in the US. In a 2009 study conducted by FINRA,
(National Financial Capability Study (NFCS), 2009) respondents correctly answered on
average only 3 of 5 basic financial literacy quiz questions. Based on 2004 HRS data
Lusardi and Mitchell (2008) had similar findings; respondents had low numeracy and
lack an understanding of basic concepts such as inflation. Financial literacy skills vary
by gender, educational attainment and race. Women have lower skills relative to males
(NFCS, 2009; State Farm, 2008; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). Minorities and those with
lower levels of education also demonstrate low financial literacy (NFCS, 2009; Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2006, 2007).
Increasing age and financial literacy have also been shown to be negatively
correlated. In their 2011 study of cognitive processing Finke, Howe and Huston found
that financial literacy declined 2% annually beginning at age 60. However, individuals
failed to recognize this decline. The decline is linked with poor decision making and
increases vulnerability to fraud. Ninety-six percent of survey respondents (Investor
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Protection Trust, 2012) cited diminished comprehension as a predictor of elder fraud.
They also found it “very consistent” with an earlier study linking Alzheimer’s and
vulnerability to fraud (43.3%). In 2007, Plassman et al. estimated that 13.9% of the
population 71 and older had a dementia diagnosis and 9.7% had Alzheimer’s; these
proportions increase with age. By 2012, of the population 65 and older, 13% has
Alzheimer’s disease (Alzheimer’s Disease Facts and Figures, 2012). Increasing levels of
diminished cognitive function may make it more difficult for elders vulnerable to plan
and execute a reasonable decumulation strategy, particularly in their latter years.
Retirees could compensate for low financial literacy and/or diminished capacity
by employing the help of a professional. However in spite of low financial literacy
Hanna (2011) found that only 25% of households aged 30-69 and 16% of those over 70
use a financial planner; the Allsup Medicare Advisor Seniors Survey (2012) found onethird of retirees use financial planners. This is an increase from 2002, when Elmerick,
Montalto and Fox reported that 15% of seniors 65+ used financial planners. Usage of
these services varies by race; usage is highest for white families (28%), 21% for black
families and only 12% for Hispanic families (Hanna, 2011). Women are less likely to
use professional services than men (State Farm, 2008).
Reasons cited for not using a planner include risk aversion (with rates of use
increasing with risk tolerance) (Hanna, 2011); refusal to pay a fee for service, and
insufficient asset levels to warrant advice (Harris 2011). There could be a growing
mistrust in financial service providers since they have been identified as perpetrators of
elder financial abuse (MetLife, 2011) and named in lawsuits by their employees and the
Department of Labor for Employee Retirement Income Security Act violations (Pensions
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and Investments, 2013; Investment News, 2013). Another explanation could be that
elders perceive their level of financial literacy is greater than it actually is (Agnew and
Szykman, 2005) and they do not realize they would benefit from professional services.
This proposed dissertation will address several important gaps in the literature.
This study will examine household transitions across categorization of dissaving. It will
also address whether wealth depletion rates by households are placing them at risk for
outliving their assets. This determination will be based on actual adjustments to health,
longevity and financial shocks over the period of study (as opposed to projections).
Finally, the impact of changes to family structure and composition will be identified.
The current study will assess 1) the relationship between decumulation categories
across time, and 2) wealth depletion as a function of health status and family
composition. The dissertation will address the following research questions:
o

Do decumulation patterns vary across households?


Relative to the current time period, what is the probability of being
in each divest outcome category (on target, overspender,
oversaver) in the next time period?



Is there a relationship between the observed divest category and
the divest category in the next observation period?

o

How does health status impact depletion?

o

Is there a relationship between change to marital status and depletion rate?

o

Is there an association between change in family composition and
decumulation?
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Understanding whether people either divest too slowly or too quickly and who
they are is important to a variety of professionals. Financial advisors will be required to
manage existing assets over time to ensure that their clients do not outlive their income
stream. Research focused on decumulation could also inform policymakers and
retirement plan sponsors seeking to create more cost-effective, efficient savings vehicles.
Finally, government officials addressing entitlement program modifications may find
these types of studies informative.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. First, the literature on
decumulation is reviewed. Next, the conceptual model for assessing the risk of outliving
assets is presented. Chapter 4 discusses the measures and methodologies used in the
analysis of the research questions. Results of the analysis are found in Chapter 5.
Finally, the dissertation concludes with a discussion of the findings and a policy
recommendation.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The decision to decumulate assets involves converting assets accumulated in the
working years to an income stream in later life. The factors influencing the decision to
decumulate are complex and dynamic. This section provides an overview of assets
potentially available for decumulation, the current body of knowledge on dissaving, and
factors which influence the creation of an income stream.
Sources of Income in Later Life
According to 2010 Social Security Administration calculations, singles and
married couples 65 and older derived 37% of their income from Social Security, 9% from
government employee pensions, 9% from private pensions, 11% from asset income, 30%
from earnings and 4% from other sources (Social Security Administration, 2012).
Elders’ sources of income are important for multiple reasons. Income can be used to
finance late life consumption and researchers have linked the level of asset income to the
rate of asset drawdown (DeNardi, French and Jones, 2010). Those with higher levels of
income drawdown their assets at a slower rate than elders with lower income levels.
Social Security Income
An individual’s Social Security benefit is intended to replace a portion of income
and will be paid over an individual’s entire lifetime. As of December 2013 over 54
million elders were receiving Social Security retirement benefits. The average monthly
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benefit for retired workers was $1,247; a retired couple collected $1,942 on average and a
widow or widower received an average benefit of $1,244 per month (“Monthly Statistical
Snapshot”, December 2013).
The earliest age at which retirement benefits can be claimed is 62. Benefits
increase for each year from age 62 until age 70 that you delay claiming your benefit. The
timing of the initial election of this program is critical for determining monthly benefit
amounts. It sets the base rate for monthly payments, to which annual cost of living
adjustments are made. Please refer to figure 1 for an example of how benefit rates will
differ by election start.

Figure 1. Monthly Social Security Benefit by Age of Election

Source: When to Start Receiving Retirement Benefits, SSA Publication No. 0510147, July 2008, ICN 480136
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Workers who become disabled and meet earnings criteria can qualify for Social
Security Disability Income (SSDI) payments. The monthly disability payment is based
on average lifetime earnings (Social Security Administration, June 2012). As of
December 2013 over 54 million elders were receiving Social Security retirement benefits.
The average monthly benefit for retired workers was $1,247; a retired couple collected
$1,942 on average and a widow or widower received an average benefit of $1,244 per
month (“Monthly Statistical Snapshot,” December 2013).
Defined Benefit Income
Payments from a defined benefit plan (commonly referred to as pensions) have
also been an important income stream for the elderly. This is in spite of the fact that over
time fixed value pensions will degrade in value due to inflation. Defined benefit (db)
plans provide a guaranteed income and typically do not require any contribution from the
employee. There are a number of formulas that db plan sponsors can use to determine
final retirement benefits; they range from a flat dollar amount per year of service to
average earnings for a specified number of years (EBRI, 2009). Regardless of the
formula used, the employer agrees to a future benefit amount and assumes the
corresponding investment risk required to meet future benefit obligations.
There has been a steady decline in the proportion of employees participating in
employer sponsored benefit plans. The Survey of Consumer Finance (Bucks, et al.,
2009) shows a 1.6% decline in the number of families with access to a defined benefit
plan through either a current or past employer for the period 2004-2007. A 2007 Bureau
of Labor Statistics Survey found that 6% of private sectors workers had access to only a
defined benefits (db) plan; 40% had access to only a defined contribution (dc) plan; 15%
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had access to both db and dc plans and 39% worked for an employer without a pension
plan. EBRI (2012) reports that as of 2011 only 3% of private sector workers participated
in a defined benefits plan, 31% participated in a defined contribution plan, and 11%
participated in both plans. Fifty-five percent of private sector workers are not enrolled in
an employer based program.
Annuities
With the challenges of managing increased longevity, market risk, declining
income from defined benefit pensions (public and private), and inflation, one way to
address this risk is to turn to fixed annuities for a reliable income stream. Annuities
transfer risk to the insurance company. The annuitant purchases a life annuity in
exchange for a series of future payments (Fullmer, 2007). Single life annuities provide
benefits to the individual up until the time of their death. Joint life annuities pay benefits
as long as either of the two beneficiaries survives (Ameriks, 2004). A mix of fixed and
variable annuities is recommended by financial experts to manage inflation over time
(Milevsky and Young, 2007).
According to LIMRA (2012), sales of standard annuities with fixed payments in
2012 decreased 7% from 2011 sales (from $158 to $147 billion) and variable annuity
sales declined 10% over 2011. Overall annuity purchases were down 8% in 2012, for
total sales of $219 billion.
Why Aren’t Individuals Purchasing Annuities?
A number of studies have examined why so few annuity policies are sold.
Ameriks (2004) found that some annuitants see annuities as introducing risk; they worry
that they will “lose” money if they die young. However, the guarantee period (the
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minimum period in which payments will be made) mitigates this risk. If an annuitant
dies before the minimum period benefits are paid to a designated beneficiary through the
end of the period. Several researchers have found that the cost of annuities has served as
a barrier (Brown and Poterba, 2000; Mitchell et al. 1999; Friedman and Warshawsky,
1990) however Babbel and Merrill (2007) found that the markup on such policies has
decreased substantially over the past decade. Annuity markups (a one time fee) are also
more economical when compared to annual mutual fund loads. Finally, they point out
that annuities offer a guaranteed income stream while mutual funds provide no such
benefit.
Purchasers are also concerned that their benefit could be eroded by inflation.
Here again Babbel and Merrill (2007) point to the range of annuity products available
which would provide against this risk. Laitner (1997) concludes that a bequest motive
serves as a deterrent to annuity purchase. Sinclair and Smetters (2004) found that the
need for liquidity to pay for unexpected health care expenses inhibits individuals from
purchasing annuities. Others have found that family members provide income for health
emergencies or financial insecurity thus individuals informally “self-insure” (Brown and
Poterba, 2000; Kotlikov and Spivak 1981). Based on benefits available from other
annuities (Social Security and employer pensions) Dushi and Webb (2004) conclude that
elders have no need to convert funds into an additional annuity. Support for this comes
from Bernheim, 1991 and Vidal-Melia and Lejarraga-Garcia, 2006 who find that
government safety net programs “crowd out” annuity purchases.
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A recent study by Yogo (2009) has challenged the benefit of purchasing an
annuity. Using HRS data and treating health status as an endogenous variable he
concluded that median health retirees had an extremely modest gain in overall wealth
when their portfolio consisted of an annuity (only 1%) and the healthiest in the sample
only improved their wealth position by 10%. A limitation of this study is that it only
modeled female wealth therefore it may not generalize to male wealth patterns.
Extended Labor Force Attachment
Finally, there is a growing trend among elders to remain in the workforce longer.
Shattuck (2010) reports that as of 1995 17% of men and 9% of women 65 and older were
working; by 2009 the percentages increased to 22% and 13% respectively. Shattuck
posits that the recession and longevity may contribute to prolonged labor force
attachment. Working in later years was more common among better educated elders.
This is attributed to their overall better health, decreased likelihood of holding physically
demanding jobs, and a greater ability to find work. Bosworth and Burke (2012) finds a
similar rise in participation rates and attribute the change to the decrease in db plan
coverage and increase in dc plans. For those in db plans, the benefit amount is capped at
a certain point and the benefit can only be claimed by those who withdraw from
employment, thereby inducing workers to retire whereas benefit levels may increase with
future contributions to dc plans.
Using data from the 2011 Census Bureau Copeland (2012) finds that workers
age 55 and older were increasingly likely to remain in the workforce through 2011. He
attributes this increase to the need to accumulate additional retirement savings and obtain
employer-sponsored health care coverage. Drawing from Bureau of Labor Statistics and
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Consumer Population Survey data, Rix (2013) reports similar findings, noting increased
worker participation rates for those 55+.
Assets Available for Decumulation
Households can enter the decumulation phase with tax-deferred, non-tax-deferred
plans, or both. A tax-deferred plan is an investment plan where a contributor can make
pre-tax contributions and both the contribution and interest accumulate tax free until after
withdrawal at retirement. These can be contrasted with non-tax-deferred plans, where
contributions are taxed in the year in which they are made. There are contribution limits
set by the IRS. Individuals can contribute up to $5,500 (or $6,500 if you are 50 years or
older) to all traditional and Roth IRAs in 2014 (“Retirement Topics – IRA Contribution
Limits,” 2014). Those wishing to reduce their tax liability during their working years
will opt for traditional 401(k) or traditional IRA vehicles while those willing to pay taxes
now in exchange for limiting tax liability in retirement and eliminating taxes on the
growth of the investment will likely invest in Roth IRAs or Roth 401(k)s. One’s tax rate
is expected to be lower after retirement because income is typically lower in retirement.
Types of Tax Deferred Plans
A 401(k) plan is a tax deferred plan whereby an employee contributes a portion of
his/her wages to the plan on a pretax basis. While these wages are subject to Social
Security, Medicare and federal unemployment taxes they typically are not subject to
income tax withholding at the time of deferral. The amount of deferred wages is limited
by both the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the terms of the 401(k) plan (IRS, 2012).
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An individual retirement arrangement (IRA) is a tax advantaged vehicle for
retirement savings. Typically IRA amounts are not taxed until taken as a distribution. To
be eligible for IRA contributions you (or your spouse) must have taxable income for the
tax year and be between 59.5 and 70.5 years old at the end of the tax period.
Contribution amounts are set by the IRS. An individual can establish a traditional IRA
regardless of coverage status by another retirement plan. However, coverage by an
employer retirement plan may affect the deduction allowed for your contributions (IRS,
2012).
A Roth IRA is also an individual retirement account. However, unlike the
traditional 401(k) the contributions are not deductible. The IRS has established
contribution limits for these plans also. Contributions can be made after age 70 ½, and
there is no required minimum distribution (IRS, 2012).
Decision making regarding retirement account contributions is complicated.
Individuals need to decide whether to defer taxes while employed and elect to invest in a
401(k) or contribute to a Roth IRA in which the contributions have already been taxed
and the withdrawal is tax free. Additionally, tax deferred savings require the investor to
take a distribution after 70 ½ years of age, which constitutes part of the household’s
dissaving strategy. There are tradeoffs to both decisions which must be weighed.
Self-employed individuals or small businesses provide retirement savings benefits
through Keogh plans. There are many types of such plans; the most common are
Simplified Employee Pension (SEP), Savings Incentive Match Plan for Employees
(SIMPLE) and Qualified Plans (aka H.R. 10 or Keogh plans). Deductions are allowed
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for contributions made to the plan for employees or a sole business proprietor’s own
contributions (IRS, 2012).
Upon retiring or changing jobs, workers can leave their vested balances in the
plan they had been enrolled in, the funds can be converted into an annuity, rolled over
into an Individual Retirement Account, or they can take the funds as a lump-sum
distribution (LSD). If a retirement account balance is $5,000 or less the employer can
cash out the account without the employee's approval (“Deciding what to do with your
401(k) plan when you change jobs,” 2014).
Cash out rates have been declining over time. In 1997, Yakoboski reported that
60% of those who changed jobs took LSD; 50% of this group spent a portion of the
distribution. More recently, using Health and Retirement Study data from the period
1992-2000, Hurd & Panis (2006) found that 20% of distributions from plans with a lump
sum option were cashed out. According to a 2008 survey by the Investment Company
Institute of those workers retiring between 2002 and 2007 only 7% of workers spent the
entire LSD at retirement. Thirty-four percent reinvested all of the LSD in a retirement
account, 18% annuitized the entire balance, distribution was deferred by 16%, 11%
divided the LSD between reinvesting and spending, 6% elected installment payments and
9% had multiple dispositions.
Verma & Lichtenstein (2006) analyzed 2003 Survey of Income and Program
Participation data to determine how individuals distributed funds taken as a LSD. Nearly
56% paid down debt (debt includes mortgage, loans, medical expenses, taxes). Everyday
expenses, vacations, and donations to family members accounted for approximately 30%

20

of the use; the remainder was invested in retirement savings in various forms or saved for
education.
Individuals with lower net worth, those who are divorced or separated, have poor
health status or are disabled have the highest LSD cash out rates. Lower cash out rates
were correlated with being a high income earner, highly educated, non-black, male, and
older. Depending upon how the cashed out money is spent (purchasing an annuity vs.
paying off debt) it may not be available as an income stream in later life. In their 1999
study Berman, Coe, & Gale estimated that taking a LSD could result in a reduction in
annual retirement income ranging from $1,000 to $3,000.
Cashed out funds lose their tax sheltered status; funds dispersed prior to the
worker reaching age 59 ½ are assessed an additional 10 percent penalty; there is also an
additional 20% withholding to cover the tax obligation from the withdrawal (Berman,
Coe & Gale, 1999). Tax rates, penalties and withholding rules have been demonstrated
to influence disposition of LSDs both by interacting with each other and independently
(Berman, Coe, & Gale, 1999; Gale & Dworsky, 2006). Berman et al (2008) drawing on
data from the Health and Retirement Study and Consumer Pricing Survey found that
higher tax penalties or withholdings resulted in significantly higher rollover rates.
Asset Levels in Later Life
As elders are a heterogeneous group one may assume that there will be varying
levels and disposition of assets. This assumption is supported by the literature (Poterba,
Venti & Wise, 2012; Michaud and van Soest, 2008; Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg,
2001; Keister, 2000). Chiteji and Walker (2008) reports that relative to other US
households, African American elders have lower average net worth and financial assets
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(see table 1). They found that on average African Americans 70+ years of age are more
reliant on earnings for income than other US households (38 vs. 32.7% respectively), and
report almost 6% less in assets/other income. This disparity is expected to continue in the
future. Weller and Wolff (2005) estimates that 25% of white households and 40% of
African American households aged 47 - 55 can expect to have an income replacement
rate of less than 50%.
Table 1.
Retired Households (age 70+)
African American
All US households
households
Net worth
$84,000
$409,000
[$36,900]
[$165,000]
Net worth minus housing equity
$34,000
$281,200
[$2,000]
[$61,000]
Financial assets
$14,000
$145,000
[$300]
[$20,000]
Note: Mean values with median in brackets.
Note: Financial assets includes stocks, bonds, certificates of deposit, checking and
savings accounts.
Note: Net worth includes financial assets, housing equity, transportation, business, farm,
real estate, IRA, trusts, and other assets.
Source: Chiteji and Walker (2008), using Health and Retirement Survey 2004 data

African Americans are not the only racial group to experience a wealth and
income gap relative to whites. As of 2008 (the most recent year for which data are
available), Social Security is the only source of income for 36.3% of elderly Latino
recipients. This figure is nearly twice that for whites (18.2%) who rely on this program
as their sole income (Social Security Administration, 2010). There is also a low level of
pension accumulation among Latinos. Nearly 86% of Latinos in this age group report no
income from private pensions or annuities, compared with fewer than 70% of similar
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aged whites. According to Orszag and Rodriguez (2005) this wealth gap can be expected
to continue over time. They found that the median combined retirement account balance
for US households aged 55-59 was $120,000 compared with approximately $35,000 for
Hispanics in this cohort.
Researchers have posited a number of explanations for these differences. Smith
(1995) found that different inheritances and bequests as well as lower minority incomes
and poorer health contributed to large racial and ethnic wealth disparities. Smith, Johnson
& Muller (2004) suggests that low 401(k) participation levels combined with low
contribution levels results in low retirement savings balances for African American
retirees. They suffer an additional penalty in that their low wages lead to lower pension
payments (as benefits are typically based on earnings). Charles & Hurst (2003) argues
that due to lower risk tolerance African Americans will accumulate less wealth relative to
similarly aged households. Shapiro (2004) finds that on average blacks and whites begin
life with different levels of family wealth and that the gap widens over the life course. A
key finding is that relative to whites fewer African Americans buy homes; those who do
accumulate less equity.
Latinos have also been found to have low participation rates in retirement plans.
A 2004 study (Rodriguez & Martinez) reports that while approximately half the overall
workforce participates in an employer pension plan only one-quarter of Latinos
participated. Using 2001 Survey of Consumer Finance data Orszag & Rodriguez (2005)
found that relative to other contributors, Latinos had lower 401(k) and IRA participation
rates and lower contribution rates at all income levels.
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Home Equity
As of 2001, on average home values comprise 35% of total assets among the
elderly (Sierminska, Brandolini and Smeeding, 2006). Home equity is important to
retirement security because in addition to the ability to sell the home a reverse equity
mortgage can be used to create an income stream. Home equity is the current market
value of a home minus the current mortgage balance. Reverse equity mortgages are loans
taken against a home which provide income to the loan holder and result in gradual
transfer of ownership of the home to the lender. Reverse equity mortgages and home
equity loans were just beginning to be used by elders in the early 2000s to access their
home equity (Fisher et al., 2007; Copeland, 2006; Hurst and Stafford, 2004). Triest et al.
(2008) finds that taking a reverse mortgage that provides a lifetime income is the best
strategy to tap home equity for all but those with excessively high risk tolerance.
According to Zedlewski, Cushing-Daniels, & Lewis (2008), based on 2006 home values
the typical homeowner could realize an 18 percent increase in annual income from a
reverse annuity. Taking into account the housing market decline they estimate that a
10% drop in home values would result in a 16% decrease to retirement income.
Health shocks have been linked to withdrawal of home equity (Venti and Wise,
2004; Banks, Blundell, Oldfield and Smith, 2007). Health shocks include death of a
spouse, entering a nursing home, difficulties with activities of daily living, or onset of
chronic illness. In their analysis of Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data from 19922002 Coile and Milligan (2005) found that that the type of health shock determined what
asset was liquidated. Acute shocks led to diminished business and real estate holdings
while those experiencing chronic shocks tended to draw down financial assets (stocks,
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bonds, IRAs). Acute shocks include heart problems, stroke or cancer; chronic is defined
as a new diagnosis of chronic illness such as lung disease or diabetes. Their results also
confirmed previous studies in which the death of a spouse was strongly correlated with
sale of the principle residence.
Decumulation Studies
Most elders are neither devising their own decumulation plans nor using the
services of financial planners. In this section I review the existing decumulation
literature to ascertain what we know about drawdown rates.
Implicit in any discussion of decumulation is the notion that assets are actually
spent down. A number of studies have called this premise into question. Mirer (1979)
using data from the Demographic and Economics Characteristics of the Aged found that
wealth decline was modest overall and non-existent for some respondents. Weil (1994)
documents that studies conducted using micro data (individual level data) support the
notion that elderly do not spend down their assets while studies relying on macro data
(aggregated data) reflect cross household relationships which serve to depress savings
levels. Zou (1995) finds that savings instead increase with age and that wealth was not
decumulated. Others have found evidence of asset run down (see DeNardi, French and
Jones, 2006; Danziger et al., 1983; Menchick and David, 1983; Thurow, 1976).
Hogarth (1991) studied Social Security Administration’s Longitudinal Retirement
History Survey (LRHS) from 1969 to 1979. The study used an unbalanced panel; three
waves of participation were required for study inclusion. Participant age at the beginning
of the study ranged from 58 to 63 years old. Five patterns emerged from the data
analysis. Households could be categorized as alternate savings and dissavings; local
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maximum (saving for some consecutive periods then maintaining or spending down
assets), local minimum (dissave over consecutive periods then maintain or save), some
savings some level periods; and some dissaving some level periods. Nearly forty-four
percent of the survey (43.5%) was some savings some level, 26.9% were local
maximizers, 17% were local minimum, 8.5% were alternate savings and dissavings and
only 4.2% were some dissaving some level periods.
This proposed research differs from Hogarth’s work in several important ways.
Market effects were measured using the year of retirement as opposed to a year variable
therefore actual fluctuations may not have been reflected in coefficient values. Finally,
inclusion in the study was dependent upon receipt of Social Security benefits.
Decumulation patterns by households that had not elected to receive benefits were not
determined nor were changes to decumulation streams pre and post benefit election
examined.
As more spending and wealth data have become available research in this area has
continued. Kim & Lee (2005) reports on the effects of health shocks and health capital on
wealth drawdown using AHEAD and HRS data. While Kim & Lee finds that reporting a
severe health condition at baseline is correlated with excessive wealth depletion for
Hispanic couples and single Whites, the data are from 1998 and do not reflect the
changes to Medicare since that time. For example, the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 established a prescription drug coverage
benefit for elders and provided subsidies for eligible individuals. It also fails to account
for region of the country, which has been correlated with both frequency of diagnostic
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practices (Song, Skinner, Sutherland, et al., 2010) and medical costs (Fisher, Bynum, &
Skinner, 2010).
Love & Smith (2007) studied households 50 and older from 1998-2004. Data
were from the Health and Retirement Survey. While there was evidence that savings
were spent down over this period, households were not drawing down at a rate that offset
gains to their wealth. The authors suggest this was a result of housing wealth gains,
precautionary savings and the desire to leave an inheritance thus it is not clear how much
of the lack of dissaving is intentional. They also examined poverty rates among the
elderly and found a significant decline in the ratio for all but the oldest cohort whose rate
remained constant. However, poverty rates have been criticized for not being an accurate
measure of the standard of living for elders. Among the criticisms is that they do not
reflect medical care costs (Census Bureau, 2011) therefore Love & Smith may be
overstating the decline in this measure.
Using Health and Retirement Study data from 1998-2006 Smith, Soto & Penner
(2009) report that elder households experienced an increase to net worth and their
decumulation rates varied by income level. Those in higher income level groups did not
dissave until quite late in life; lower income seniors are at risk for outliving their assets
and middle income elders may not entirely deplete their savings. Housing equity and
capital gains largely contributed to the increase to net worth. However, it is not clear
whether the failure for the high income group to dissave is a reflection of intentional
saving or unexpected financial gains. Due to the timeframe of their study they also are
unable to model the effects of the housing market decline on decumulation. Finally, they
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estimated fixed panel models therefore they do not capture the spending patterns of those
who died.
Hurd and Rohwedder (2010) using HRS CAMS data from 2001-2007 examined
three measures of spending; changes to wealth based on income and spending levels,
mean changes to wealth over time, and wealth simulations. Results indicate that all
participants age 75+ will dissave. Singles drawdown their assets at age 70, and
drawdown rates increase with age. This study excluded households with children living
at home. The authors base this exclusion on the assumption that a bequest motive will
depress spending and expense allocation cannot be determined. Households with couples
where one spouse is more than five years older than the other were also omitted from the
analysis since it is presumed they will have a different decumulation strategy. Therefore,
due to sample selection criteria it is possible households that either would not dissave or
would dissave at low levels have been omitted from the study. Also, the study does not
assess whether these decumulation rates are sustainable over time.
Hurd & Rohwedder (2008) analyzed Health and Retirement Study Consumption
and Activities Mail Survey data from 2001 – 2005 to determine if consumption rates in
recent retirees were sustainable over time, based on annuities and assets at the onset of
retirement. Retirees in the survey are community dwelling (respondents are not
incarcerated or in nursing homes). For couples, one spouse was 66-69 and the other
spouse was at least 62; singles are 66-69. Study results suggest that singles fare worse in
retirement than couples. Singles can maintain their consumption based on mean wealth
levels but median wealth levels would require a reduction in consumption a decade into
retirement. Both average and median calculations indicate that couples can maintain their
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consumption with small withdrawals from their asset stock. A problem with these
estimates is that health shocks and rising health care costs were not modeled. According
to Finkelstein (2007) two-thirds of those 65+ will enter a nursing home. These stays are
costly and are funded mostly out of pocket. Banerjee (2012) notes that health related
expenses account for the second highest total expenditure for those 75+ years old.
Haider et al (2000) is one of the few studies to examine rates of depletion not
entirely based on HRS data. Their study draws on data from the Social Security
Administration’s New Beneficiary Data System (NBDS) (respondents who first received
benefits in 1980-1981 were interviewed in 1982 and 1991) and the 1993 and 1995 waves
of the Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) panel. Consistent
with life cycle hypothesis (LCH), wealth was constant for those in the NBDS sample.
However, as the authors note, it is not a representative sample since it is restricted to
those first electing Social Security benefits. In the AHEAD sample households with
lower income, marital disruption and lower levels of education tended to dissave while
married households, those with higher educational attainment and higher levels of income
tended to increase their wealth. These findings may not be applicable for other cohorts of
retirees. Earlier groups of retirees had more access to defined benefit plans as well as
shorter life expectancies. Thus they did not need to rely on savings as much for
retirement as future generations will; this could result in different spend down patterns.
Haveman, Holden et al (2005) used NBDS data to estimate annuitized wealth and
compare this estimate with two measures of income adequacy (ability to replace 70% of
pre-retirement income and whether or not income is above or near National Research
Council poverty guideline levels). Wealth figures were estimated for couples, single men
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and single women. Twenty percent of those who met the replacement rate in 1982 did
not meet that measure of adequacy in 1991. Of the 33% of households with inadequate
replacement rates in 1982, nearly 67% were still below the desired replacement rate.
Overall 53% of the sample saw an increase to their annuitized wealth while 38% of the
sample saw their annuitized wealth decline. Factors associated with increases in wealth
include longer work histories, being white, income from earnings while retired, owning a
home, higher levels of education, and private health insurance. Similar to Haider et al
(2000) this study has sample bias and cohort limitations.
Sun and Webb (2012) compares three common decumulation strategies (spending
interest earned, 4% annual drawdown and following the MRD tables) for single men,
single women and couples. Based on their models they conclude that the strategy based
on MRD tables is the optimal dissaving option. However, they model initial wealth and
spend down is based on age 65 life expectancy. Modeling actual changes to wealth and
increases to remaining life expectancy may have produced different results from those
reported.
Designing an Income Stream in Later Life
Due to the risks imposed by each, a sustainable dissaving strategy should take into
account longevity, inflation and uncertain medical costs. These risks are discussed
below.
Longevity Risk
For elders designing an income stream one of the first considerations is “how long
will I need to survive on my available funds?” or longevity risk. Outliving their assets is
one of the most serious risks elders face. According to Michael Falcon, J.P. Morgan
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Asset Management’s head of retirement “Accumulation is hard but it’s not complicated.
Decumulation – and hopefully decumulating in a way where you don’t outlive your
money – is both hard and complicated.” (Volz, 2012). Several studies indicate that elders
can reasonably plan for their longevity; however they tend to underestimate their life
expectancy (Society of Actuaries, 2012; Sondergeld, Drinkwater and Jamison, 2002;
Hurd and McGarry, 1997). According to 2010 National Center for Health Statistics data
(2013), the average remaining life expectancy for a 65 year old was an additional 19.1
years; nearly half of this group will live longer. Life expectancy estimates vary by race
and gender, females are expected to outlive males and white women are expected to
outlive black women by on average 1.0 years.
Inflation
Inflation is an increase in the overall price of goods in the economy (Mankiw, 2004).
The inflation rate has averaged 4.5% annually over the last 45 years (author’s calculation,
based on US Inflation Calculator, 2013). Even a historically low inflation rate can erode
purchasing power over time. For example, an individual who had $10,000 in savings
would find that after 20 years their at a steady 2% rate of inflation they would have the
purchasing equivalent of only $6,729 (“The risks of “safe” investing,” 2013).
Financial planners will advise elders to diversify the risk of their portfolio into
income providing and long term growth portions. Both of these portions are subject to
inflationary pressures. Most investors will have a fixed-income portion such as bonds.
However, government bonds do not do well during inflationary periods, since rising
interest rates erode their buying value. Inflation protected bonds are available, but this
protection comes at a cost. Real estate has historically performed well during inflationary
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times; however real estate values can plummet during a recession. Some advisers
recommend investing up to 50% of the portfolio in stocks (the growth portion) to hedge
against inflation. As shown by recent market conditions, this investment is not guaranteed
to grow or even retain its value.
Future Medical Expenses
Uncertain medical costs also complicate the creation of a sustainable dissaving
strategy. Elders could be expected to protect against health-related risks by purchasing
long term care insurance (LTCI). LTCI pays for services needed by those with
difficulties performing activities of daily living. AZF Insurance Services estimates that
currently about 12.8 million Americans require long term care; only 2.4 million of this
group lives in nursing homes. Kemper, Komisar, and Alecxih (2005) report that
approximately two-thirds of Americans will need long term care at some point in their
lives; services will be required for on average 3 years. Brown and Finkelstein (2009)
estimates one third to half will reside in a nursing home and that between 10 and 20
percent of those in nursing homes will be institutionalized for more than five years.
MetLife (2012) reports that 2012 costs for in home health care aides and homemaker
services are on average $21 and $20/hour respectively. Nursing home costs averaged
around $248 per day for a private room or $90,520 annually.
According to LIMRA (2009) sales for individual LTCI in 2008 were 7% lower
than the previous year. By year end 2008 there were 4.8 million LTCI policies. In 2008,
the average cost of LTCI for a 65 year old wishing to purchase a base benefit policy was
$1,342 per year (American Association for Long-Term Care Insurance, 2008). These
policies must be renewed annually. Use of benefits will likely result in an increase in
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annual premiums; onset of some physical conditions can render an individual uninsurable
(J. DeLuca, personal communication, March 28, 2009).
Lack of affordability is one reason why individuals are not purchasing these
policies; another is the failures of policies to offer complete long term care coverage
(Cutler, 1993). A third reason is substitutes; higher net worth individuals prefer to selfinsure against this risk. A study by AARP (2001) found that a majority of those surveyed
believed that Medicare would cover long term care costs, therefore LTCI is not
necessary. Finally, Pauly (1990) concluded that individuals avoid buying LTCI since it
could serve as a disincentive for “no cost” informal services provided by family
members.
Inadequate insurance coverage can make creation of a dissaving strategy more
difficult. It introduces a level of risk as Medicare only covers a percentage of medical
bills, and not all services are covered. Substantial increases to out of pocket cost can lead
to unplanned overspending. For households with low assets the ability to meet nonmedical household expenses could be compromised.
Do Elders Actually Create a Dissaving Strategy?
Overall it does not appear that a great deal of planning is executed by retirees
when it comes to their divestiture strategy. A recent Wells Fargo/Gallup poll (2012)
shows that of those surveyed only 38% of retirees have created a documented plan for
retirement spending, a 9% decrease from 2011. The Consumer Federation of America
survey (2012) reports that 49% of those surveyed (adults 18+ who are responsible for
family finances) have created a retirement plan. Only slightly more than half (53%) of
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those who have retirement savings and self-identifying as retired have estimated their
annual withdrawal amount.
Vanguard’s 2008 survey found that of those making withdrawals, 21% had no
formal strategy. Withdrawals based on consumption needs were the most commonly
cited strategy (37%), 21% based their spending on a targeted dollar figure; 20% relied on
a self-created “rule of thumb”, 10% used a “gut feeling”, 9% withdrew a specified
percentage, and 6% used a formal spending rule.
Of those with a plan, 80% report they are confident they can meet their financial
goals as stated (Wells/Fargo 2012). Retirees in a Wachovia survey (2008) report that
40% of retirees feel “very confident” they will not outlive their assets; only 28% are
worried they will incorrectly invest their assets. Survey respondents found saving for
retirement more difficult than managing their assets in retirement (61% vs. 39%,
respectively).
Perhaps this attitude explains the frequency of plan review; less than half the
households surveyed (44%) have an established schedule for ongoing monitoring and
review of their drawdown plan, 49% revisit their plan but not on a predetermined
timeframe and 7% rarely or never review or modify their plan on a regular basis
(Vanguard, 2008). Milliman (2009) recommends that plans be reviewed every three
years; specified events could trigger an off-cycle review (market volatility, health shocks,
etc.). It appears that most households with plans are not reviewing them on a sufficiently
frequent basis, perhaps placing their strategy at risk.
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Finally, for those households with a plan implementation and adherence are low.
According to the 2013 Retirement Confidence Survey (EBRI, 2013), only 46% of retirees
with a decumulation plan followed all of the recommendations. Mistrust of financial
advisors is apparently a barrier to adherence; nearly half (48%) did not trust the advice
they were given. Cost also is a factor; 44% reported they could not afford professional
advice. A small percentage reported they had better sources of financial advice (5%), 4%
relied on their own knowledge or financial goals and 3% had a change in their personal
circumstances and viewed the advice as non-applicable.
Government Mandated Dissaving
For those holding IRAs, a portion of their decumulation plan is created for them;
public policy mandates decumulation of this asset in late life. Contributors must
withdraw funds from an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) beginning in the calendar
year after age 70 ½ (known as the minimum required distributions, or MRD). Once
exception to this tax policy is the Roth IRA; since the balance represents after-tax dollars
no distribution is required.
The company holding the IRA calculates the MRD. It is determined by dividing
the IRA balance by the life expectancy found in the Uniform Lifetime Table. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is responsible for the Uniform Lifetime Table. If the
owner of the IRA fails to take the MRD, the IRS will take 50% of the amount s/he should
have withdrawn (“Required Minimum Distributions,” 2014).
Elders are increasingly responsible for their financial security, yet possess little
financial literacy. They are required to perform the increasingly difficult challenge of
balancing consumption needs, creating an income stream from existing assets and
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annuities, and preserving capital yet they are reluctant to use the services of those trained
to design asset streams. Prior research suggests that at some point most households will
decumulate, however the ages and rates of decumulation vary with income and
demographic factors. As the financial environment for retirees continues to shift towards
greater self-funding, increasing longevity and uncertain medical costs the need for
continued research on this topic is pressing.
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CHAPTER 3
CONCEPTUAL MODEL

The Life Course Model
For the purposes of understanding decumulation, the conceptualization and
measurement of sociological as well as economic components has been added by looking
to Elder’s life course model.
Elder (1985) characterizes time as a series of transitions, or short-term discrete
events, which are embedded in trajectories. Trajectories can be thought of as long-term
patterns of behavior or pathways. Working careers or parenthood are examples of
trajectories while starting a job or having a child is a transition. The impact of these
trajectories and transitions are contingent upon when they occur in a person’s life. For
example, if an individual is forced to retire earlier than they had planned this may lead to
designing a different decumulation strategy than an “on time” retirement. Events such as
divorce can lead women to reach the decumulation phase with lower assets and small
Social Security benefits.
The elements of Elder’s life course paradigm are incorporated into the formalized
life course model. Support for this comes from Rank (2008) who argues for the
importance of timing of events, family structure, human development and sequencing for
asset levels across the life span. He posits that the life cycle itself has varying periods of
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economic security. He further states that the timing of particular events (such as birth of
children or unemployment) and when they occur can also influence family asset levels.
Individual development experiences in one’s childhood (quality of education, parental
resources, etc.) can have lifelong consequences in terms of social and employment skills.
If life events are experienced out of sequence (for example, teenage pregnancy and later
high school graduation) there can be negative consequences in later life. Overlapping life
events (being a member of the “sandwich” generation with your children and parents
alive) can lead to high stress levels.
Johnson and Favreault (2004) provide support for the notion that timing of events
and structural context (the normative constraints that influence our behaviors and beliefs)
matter. They find that being a single mother is linked with financial insecurity in later
life, particularly for those who do not have access to spousal benefits.
Within the integrated model it is assumed that the decumulation decision is
shaped by the historical time, place and context in which it occurs (Elder, 1998). It is
therefore expected that members of different birth cohorts will have different
decumulation patterns. Timing of events and transitions are an element of the
interdisciplinary model. Interdependent lives and intergenerational ties are also principles
of the expanded model (Elder 1985, 1995). It is assumed that the decumulation decision
will incorporate the needs of family members and spouses.
Human agency is incorporated into this model. It is assumed that individuals aim
to make the most rational choice available to them. Choices are constrained by
incomplete information, opportunities and their social context. The incorporation of life
course elements will provide the context for human agency and the utility decision.
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Finally, the model takes into consideration that not all households accumulate
wealth equally. Wealth has been associated with race (Shapiro, 2004; Gittleman &
Wolff; 2004), gender (Chang, 2010; Conley and Ryvicker, 2004) and family composition
(Chang and Muhammad, 2012; Keister, 2000). Therefore the effects of demographics on
dissaving (asset decumulation) will be incorporated in the model.
The Formalized Life Course Model
The decision to decumulate is made based on a number of interacting factors.
These elements are shaped over the entire life course of the households involved. The
complexity and dynamic nature of these factors has led to the formulation of the
hypotheses regarding dissaving. The Formalized Life Course Model (figure 2) illustrates
how a modified life cycle theory can be used to identify factors related to establishing
divestiture streams. There are a number of factors associated with dissaving in this
model. These factors can be categorized into three groupings: demographics, life course
variables, and decumulation factors.
Demographic characteristics of households included are race, age, gender,
educational attainment, longest held occupation sector and geographic location. Gender
can shape the choice of occupation as well as timing and duration of workforce
attachment (Warner, Haywood & Hardy, 2007). A survey by Ariel/Hewitt showed that
there are different savings rates, levels of participation and different portfolio
composition by race (Ariel/Hewitt, 2012). Financial literacy is required to create an
optimal decumulation stream. Financial literacy skills vary by gender, educational
attainment and age. Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) found that higher education levels and
financial literacy are positively correlated.
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Demographics
Race
Age
Gender
Educational Attainment
Longest Held Occupation
Sector
Geographic Location
Life Course
Timing of Events
Health Shocks
Widowed
Divorced
Historical Context
Homeowner
Reached 71
Secular Effects Cycle
Family Composition
Initial Marital Status
Children Living at Home
Spouse in Nursing Home

Divestiture Stream

Decumulation Factors
Income
Consumption Needs
(Health Related)
Health Insurance

Figure 2 Conceptual Model
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Older and young persons have lower financial literacy relative to middle aged
individuals and men have higher financial literacy than women.
Hypothesis 1: Decumulation patterns will vary across households; it is
expected that household draw down rates will vary with time.
Hypothesis 2: It is difficult to manage assets in retirement therefore it is
expected that households will transition among decumulation outcome categories.
Hypothesis 3: The observed cycle’s categorization will influence the next
cycle’s drawdown rate in an attempt to maintain a sustainable drawdown rate.
Life course variables include the timing of events (health shocks, being widowed
or divorced), historical context (secular cycle effects) and family composition (initial
marital status, children living at home, and a spouse in a nursing home). Cancian and
Reed (2009) finds that household size and composition are determinants of draw down
rates. An increase to the number of children increases the risk of poverty (due to
increased financial demands and decreased working hours) whereas getting married
decreases the likelihood of poverty (through economies of scale and the addition of a
possible second source of household income). They also find that female headed
households are disadvantaged relative to male headed households due to the combined
effect of lower earnings and fewer hours worked.
For example, in 2007, large employers reported that 401(k) plans were the
primary retirement benefit available to their employees whereas a decade earlier
employers cited defined benefit plans (Hewitt, 2009). Since 401(k) and IRA assets can
be held in stock, changes in market valuation could affect wealth levels and divestiture
plans.
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Hypothesis 4: The onset of a health condition will predict an excessive
depletion of assets.
Hypothesis 5: Marital dissolution or death of a spouse will be associated with
excessive decumulation.
Hypothesis 6: The admission of a spouse to a nursing home will be associated
with excessive decumulation.
Decumulation factors include income, health-related consumption needs, and
health insurance. In the 21st century, late life consumption is financed by savings and
income. Income sources include wages from work, government (Social Security, SSDI),
and employer based defined contribution and defined benefit programs. Thus economic
security of elders is in part determined by their lifetime experiences of employment and
savings. A recent Census Bureau Brief (January 2013) reported a 4 percent increase in
labor force participation for those 65+ from 1990 to 2010. This increase was partially
attributed to increased longevity and financial pressures. There is also evidence
suggesting that health declines can lead to excessive wealth depletion (Lyons &
Yilmazer, 2005).
As shown in figure 2, how elder households use their financial assets is
determined by a complex set of factors. These factors are in turn influenced by the
historical context in which the dissaving decision is made. By examining patterns of
dissaving we can identify characteristics associated with different decumulation
strategies. These characteristics can be used by financial advisers to shape financial
planning services.

42

Similarly policymakers can take these characteristics into consideration when
evaluating the structure of social programs and changes to tax laws. Chapter 4 discusses
how the patterns of dissaving will be examined.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA

The objective of this study is to examine wealth depletion over time and factors
associated with depletion. In this section I present the data source, sample selection
criteria, variable definitions, and the specifications of the statistical models used to
address my research questions.
Data
This study used multiple waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and
RAND HRS files to examine patterns of asset decumulation. The HRS is a nationally
representative longitudinal study of community dwelling older adults (Juster and
Suzman, 1995). The original HRS cohort included those in the contiguous United States
born from 1931–1941. They provided three waves of data; 1992, 1994 and 1996. The
AHEAD survey population was residents born in 1923 or earlier and provided study data
for 1993 and 1995. In 1998 the studies were merged and two additional cohorts were
included. These were the Children of the Great Depression (born 1924-1930) and the War
Babies cohort (born 1942-1947). Respondents were tracked until death and exit
interviews with surviving family members were conducted where possible.
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The HRS uses a stratified multistage area probability sample and is designed to be
representative of all non-institutionalized civilian individuals in the contiguous United
States. An over sampling of Blacks and Hispanics was taken due to their growing
numbers in the total population. Currently respondents enter the sample at age 51 and are
tracked until their death. Spouses/partners are included regardless of their age.
(University of Michigan, Health and Retirement Study, accessed November 19, 2012).
The HRS was chosen as it contains detailed health, demographic, housing, work,
employment history, family structure, insurance, asset, and income measures. Its
longitudinal design allows for tracking individual household changes over time.
Study Sample Selection
Study data were drawn from six biennial waves of the HRS (1998 - 2008), and
merged RAND HRS data files for the period 1998 – 2008. RAND HRS data set Version
J was used as it contains the relevant HRS variables and has consistent variable
definitions across waves. A twelve year period was selected to allow for patterns of
decumulation to be observed. This time span accommodated the loss of one wave of data
for lagged variables. It also corresponds to a period of economic fluctuation, allowing for
those effects to be studied over time. As of the inception of this study, the latest year
with final data for the RAND HRS data set was 2008, thus it was selected as the last
wave of the study. The 1998 wave serves as the baseline year of analysis for this study.
The unit of observation for this study is the household. Financial respondent
attributes were specified to characterize households because they provided the financial
responses. The study sample is first restricted to financial respondents who were 60
years or older during the 1998 interview period. Respondents 60 years and older were
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included to allow for early claiming of Social Security benefits at age 62.
Spouses/partners of any age were included.
A working restriction was also imposed. The working restriction was to allow for
the possibility of supplementing income but not include those on an earnings path in the
research. Financial respondents who reported working full time (40 hours a week) were
excluded from the sample. This same restriction was imposed on the respondent’s
spouse/partner. If the spouse/partner reported working 40+ hours, the household was
excluded from the study sample.
There were a large number of missing values for the set of longest held
occupation sector categorical variables (5,085). Since longest held occupation sector is
not a key predictor variable, a variable named missing occupation sector was coded and
specified in the analytic models. The remaining variables with the greatest number of
missing were other insurance (365 missing values) and government insurance (361
missing values). After deleting observations with any missing values in study variables
other than occupation sector 51,499 person wave observations were available for
analysis.
The dataset was further restricted to those households providing survey data for a
minimum of three waves; those who were lost due to death or attrition in Wave 3 or later
were retained in the sample if proxy interview data were available for Wave 3. This
exclusion was imposed due to the requirements of the Markov MNL model. The Markov
model requires three waves because a separate model is run for each of the last period’s
decumulation outcomes. In this model, the decumulation outcome between waves 1 and
2 is a factor explaining decumulation outcomes between waves 2 and 3. This last
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exclusion resulted in the loss of 3,486 cases. A total of 48,013 person wave observations
were eligible for analysis.
The multinomial model is an unbalanced panel with 9,274 households spanning
six time periods. There are 3 observations for 12.43% of the households (the minimum
number of observations required for inclusion in the study); 4 observations for 14.85%, 5
observations for 15.29% of households and 57% of households have observations in all 6
time periods.
Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis
A multinomial logistic regression was used to analyze if health has a differential
impact on the probability of wealth depletion. Study data from the six biennial waves of
the HRS (1998 - 2008), and merged RAND HRS data files for the period 1998 – 2008
were combined to create one concatenated analysis file. The multinomial logistic model
was used to examine Hypotheses 4-6.
A dependent variable was created for the periods 1998-2000, 2000-2002, 20022004, 2004-2006, and 2006-2008 indicating whether or not a household’s observed
depletion rate was within a defined range, above, or below the range. The target range has
a 10% allowable margin of error to account for the challenge households face when
reacting to changes in market rates and planning for their financial future. Definitions for
the dependent variable as well as the independent variables are provided in the following
section.
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Measures
Dependent Variable
A categorical dependent variable was created for the primary multinomial logit
model. It was coded for the periods 1998-2000 (Divest1), 2000-2002 (Divest2), 20022004 (Divest3), 2004-2006 (Divest4), and 2006-2008 (Divest5). The data contain
imputed values for households with missing data. Imputed values were calculated by the
HRS. Income and asset data reported were converted to 2008 Consumer Price IndexUrban-Research Series adjusted dollars.
Each dependent variable was constructed as follows. First I annuitized the
household baseline wealth for each pair of waves. The formula for calculating the annuity
is as follows:
Wy0 = w[(1+r)LE-1]/[(1+r)LEr]
where:
Wy0 = Wealth in baseline year
r = real rate of interest
LE = remaining life expectancy
w = annual withdrawal amount
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention gender and race specific mortality
tables were used for the life expectancy values (National Center for Health Statistics,
2012). Life expectancy figures for Other race respondents were taken from the life tables
for Whites. Life expectancy figures for Hispanic respondents were taken from the life
tables for Blacks. Since couples will create their retirement spending plans jointly, an
average of remaining life expectancy was used for married couples. The real rate of

48

interest used (2.9%) is the intermediate assumption rate from the 2012 Social Security
Trustee’s Report (The 2012 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal OldAge and Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, 2012, p.103).
There is a relatively low level of financial literacy among US residents (National
Financial Capability Study, 2009). Yet households must manage their income stream and
finances in later life. Since managing wealth draw down can be difficult I allow for a
margin of error or tolerance corridor around the annual withdrawal rate. The question
then became which corridor target to choose. The bounds had to be wide enough to
accommodate market fluctuations but not so large that any decumulation choice would
fall within tolerance. I reviewed the pension literature for guidance. The 2006 Pension
Protection Act (Pension Protection Act, 2006) and The Worker, Retiree, Employer and
Recovery Act of 2008 (Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act, 2008) both allow
for a 10% corridor. Based on these pieces of legislation the corridor of +/- 10% was
selected.
Next, the 10% +/- tolerance corridor was calculated by multiplying the annual
withdrawal amount by 0.9 to determine the lower limit and 1.1 to determine the upper
limit.
I then calculated the actual withdrawal amount. The formula for the actual
withdrawal is:
a= Wy0 - Wy2
where:
Wy0 = Wealth in baseline year
Wy2 = Wealth in final year
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a = actual withdrawal amount

Since the annuity tolerance corridor is based on an annual calculation and the
actual withdrawal is for a two year period, the tolerance corridor was doubled. The
annuitized withdrawal corridor was then compared to the actual withdrawal amount.
The dependent variable for each wave was assigned a value of 3 if the actual
withdrawal amount was within the tolerance corridor. If the actual withdrawal amount
was greater than the upper limit of the tolerance corridor a value of 1 was assigned to the
dependent variable. Finally, if the actual withdrawal amount was less than the lower
limit of the tolerance corridor the dependent variable was assigned a value of 2. Category
3 is the omitted reference group, and referred to as “on target”. Category 1 is referred to
as “overspender” and category 2 is referred to as “oversaver.”
An example calculation for the multinomial logit dependent variable is provided
below. Recall that the annuity formula is:
Wy0 = w[(1+r)LE-1]/[(1+r)LEr]
For a married couple (a 79 year old white male financial respondent and his 68
year old wife of Other race) the following values are plugged into the formula:
Wy0 = Wealth in baseline year = $512,820
r = real rate of interest == .029
LE = remaining life expectancy = ((9.8 + 18.6)/2) = 14.2
w = annual withdrawal amount
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By substituting these values into the annuity formula and re-arranging the terms
we solve for w.
w= (((1+.029)14.2-1)/((1+.029)14.2.029)))/ $512,820
The annual withdrawal amount (w) for this couple is $44,572.
To calculate the tolerance corridor I multiplied the annual withdrawal amount by
0.9.
$44,572 * 0.9 = $40,114.80
Next I multiplied the annual withdrawal amount by 1.1.
$44,572 * 1.1= $49,020
The tolerance corridor is $40,114.80 - $49,020.
Taking into account that this is an annual figure (versus the study data which span
two years) the tolerance range for the household was doubled. The tolerance range for
the couple is $80,229.60 to $98,040.
Next the actual withdrawal is calculated. The formula for the actual withdrawal is
a= Wy0 - Wy2
The couple in this example had an ending wealth of $352,000. Substituting their
wealth values into the formula we solve for actual withdrawal.
a=$512,820 - $352,000
The actual withdrawal for this couple is $160,820.
The actual withdrawal amount ($160,820) is larger in value than the upper limit of
the target corridor ($98,040), therefore the household is assigned a value of 1,
overspender.
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Covariate Definitions
Following the conceptual model (see Figure 1 for diagram) a number of time
invariant and time varying characteristics were specified in the model as covariates.
These are discussed below for different classes of variables. These variables are
categorized as life course variables, demographics, and decumulation factors.
Life Course Variables
The life course variables incorporate personal, social and historical factors (Elder,
1975; Hareven, T. 1978; Hareven, T.K. 1978). Categorical dummy variables for married
baseline, never married baseline, divorced baseline and widowed baseline were created
with married baseline as the reference group. Based on a 2011 study by the National
Endowment for Financial Education finding that more than half of parents are providing
financial support to adult children, a continuous variable indicating the number of
children living with the respondent was coded. A dummy variable was created where a
value of 1 indicates that a spouse/partner is in a nursing home and 0 otherwise.
Unmarried individuals do not have the economies of scale afforded to married
couples, and dissolution of marriage has negative financial implications therefore it is
anticipated that relative to being married, not being married at baseline will be associated
with greater likelihood of overspending and lower likelihood of oversaving relative to
being on target. Since the flow of intergenerational support cannot be determined (it is
not known if the respondent is supporting children or if the children are providing
financial assistance to the respondent) the expected sign for children is unspecified.
Nursing home admission can be associated with an increase in out of pocket costs for
medical expenses not covered by insurance as well as the loss of services the spouse may
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have provided in the home. Thus it is anticipated that a spouse residing in a nursing
home will result in a household being more likely to overspend and less likely to
oversave, relative to being on target.
There are numerous financial consequences to divorce. These include legal fees,
increased living expenses (maintaining separate homes), tax implications for dissolution
of retirement accounts, and loss of health insurance. Widowhood can also jeopardize
financial security. Large out of pocket medical expenses may have been incurred prior to
the spouse’s death; there is also a potential for loss of spousal benefits (social security,
pension). Due to the financial implications presented, marital disruption is captured
using the following two variables. Divorced is a binary variable indicating whether or
not a respondent experienced divorce in the past two years. Widowed is a binary variable
indicating whether or not a respondent experienced widowhood in the past two years.
Since divorce involves the dissolution of joint property and widowhood can represent the
loss of pension income and a decrease in social security income, it is anticipated that
those reporting marital disruption are more likely to be overspenders and less likely to be
oversavers relative to being on target.
A growing body of literature suggests that onset (Smith, 2005) and severity of
health events (Lee & Kim, 2003) negatively affects wealth. This study controls for the
incidence of health conditions (health shocks). Binary variables were created for
respondents and spouse/partner which have the value of one to indicate the onset of mild
conditions (high blood pressure, psychiatric problems, and arthritis) between waves.
Binary variables were created to capture the onset of severe conditions (diabetes, cancer,
lung disease, heart disease, and stroke) between waves, with 1 indicating onset of
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condition and 0 otherwise. Conditions are classified as either mild or severe based on the
American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) Physical Status (PS) classification system.
This system was designed to standardize communication of patient health status across
various clinicians (Maloney and Weinberg, 2008). It is anticipated that the presence of
health conditions will result in a household being more likely to overspend and less likely
to oversave, relative to being on target.
Historical context was measured as follows. Homeowner is a binary variable
indicating whether or not a respondent owns a home. A dummy variable Reached 71 was
created where 1 indicates the respondent is 71 years of age or older and required to take a
retirement distribution and 0 otherwise.
A dummy cycle variable captures secular effects not reflected in the time trend
variable; it ranges from 2000-2002 (cycle2) to 2006-2008 (cycle5). Since the dependent
variable is lagged, 1998-2000 (cycle1) is not specified for the multinomial logit model.
2000-2002 (cycle2) is the omitted reference group.
The expected sign for homeownership will be unspecified. While owning a home
can protect against the uncertainties of the rental market, and homeowners tend to hold
higher levels of retirement assets elders (Nakajima and Telyukova, 2012), they rarely
access their home equity and instead spend down other assets (Triest, Sun, & Webb,
2008). The expected sign for Reached 71 is unspecified as it is not known if the required
distribution was spent or rolled back into a retirement savings vehicle. The secular
effects cycle variable is uncertain as the effect will be dependent upon the wave-specific
economic conditions.
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Demographic Variables
Race is specified using a set of categorical dummy variables (Black non-Hispanic,
Other non-Hispanic, and White non-Hispanic). White non-Hispanic serves as the omitted
reference group for race. Ethnicity is coded as 1 equals Hispanic 0 otherwise. Age is
measured in years and has been centered around 60. Female is a dummy variable
indicating gender. A series of categorical dummy variables describing educational
attainment were coded as follows: less than high school, high school, some college,
college, and masters, with less than high school serving as the reference group.
A set of categorical dummy variables were created indicating the sector a
respondent’s longest held job belonged to (service job, blue collar job, or white collar)
with white collar serving as the omitted reference group. Sector assignments were
classified using the Bureau of Labor Statistics 2001 National Compensation Survey.
Those cases with incomplete sector data were assigned to the sector missing variable.
There are a number of reasons for incomplete sector data. Sector data questions are
asked differently in different waves. This data is collected for jobs which lasted a
minimum of five years and not all waves collected occupation codes.
Categorical regional variables indicating geographic region of the country where
the respondent resides were coded. Northeast, with its highest Medicare spending per
capita (Cuckler, Martin, et. al., 2011), serves as the omitted reference group. It is
expected that educational attainment beyond less than high school diploma, living in the
south, west or Midwest and being a white collar worker will be associated with an
increased likelihood of oversaving and decreased likelihood of overspending, relative to
being on target. Conversely, age (Hurd and Reardon, 2003), being female (Chang, 2010),
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black (Shapiro, Meschede, & Sullivan, 2010), Hispanic (Taylor, et. al., 2011) or nonmarried (Pew Research Center, 2012; Hurd and Rohwedder, 2010) are anticipated to
predict a greater likelihood of overspending and a decreased likelihood of oversaving,
relative to being on target.
Blue collar and service workers on average earned less than white collar workers
thus they could be expected to save less. Therefore they are anticipated to predict a
greater likelihood of overspending and a decreased likelihood of oversaving, relative to
being on target. The expected sign for missing sector is unspecified as there is
insufficient information to determine how the respondents will draw down relative to
white collar.
Decumulation Factors
Kim and Lee (2006) suggests that co-morbidities have an effect on wealth.
Following Kim & Lee (2005), and Smith (2005), this study controls for prevalence of
health conditions (health capital) at each wave. Health variables were created for
respondent and spouse/partner (if married/partner). Based on ASA-PS classifications
health capital was coded as either mild or severe. Count variables for the presence of
mild conditions were specified for a “yes” response to a physician diagnosis of the
following conditions: high blood pressure, psychiatric problems, and arthritis. Count
variables for the presence of severe conditions were created for a “yes” response to a
physician diagnosis of the following conditions: diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart
disease and stroke. Respondents were not allowed to dispute reports from a previous
wave. As a number of health studies have found that health events have a negative
impact on wealth (Hurd and Kapetyn, 2003; Wu 2003; Lee and Kim, 2008) it is
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anticipated that health events for respondents and spouses will increase the likelihood of
overspending and decrease the likelihood of oversaving.
Income
Several income variables were tested, as the presence of income can influence
wealth draw down. Dummy variables were coded for social security, pension, social
security disability insurance (SSDI) and income from earnings. A 1 indicates the
household reported this income source; 0 otherwise.
The sign will be unspecified for the social security, SSDI and pension variables.
The presence of income from these sources could serve as an incentive to spend down
excessively (based on the belief that the income from these sources will be adequate for
future consumption). Conversely, households may under spend to mitigate the fact many
pensions are not adjusted for inflation and social security is not intended to be the
primary source of income in later life. The sign for income from earnings is unspecified;
it is unclear whether the respondent is working as a matter of choice or financial
necessity.
Health Insurance
Health insurance can mitigate the cost of out of pocket health expenses therefore a
number of insurance variables were tested. A government insurance dummy variable
was created where a value of one indicates the presence of Medicare, Medicaid, veterans
or other government health coverage and 0=otherwise. A dummy variable was created
indicating whether or not the respondent has health insurance through a current or former
employer. If the respondent reported they have health insurance coverage and the
coverage is not provided by the government or an employer or union, the Other insurance
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variable was assigned the value of 1, or 0 if no such insurance was reported. Finally, a
variable was coded to reflect cases where the respondent reported not being insured; it
was assigned a value of 1 if there was no health insurance and 0 otherwise.
The presence of insurance will serve to offset the cost of health care thus is
anticipated to decrease the likelihood of being an overspender and increase the odds of
oversaving, relative to being on target. Table 2 presents the definitions of the variables.
Expected signs are found in Table 3.
Table 2.
Variable Definition and Coding
Variable
Dependent Variable
Divest

Definition
1=Household has depleted an excessive
amount, 2=Household has depleted less
than the expected amount, 3=Household
has depleted the expected amount (+/10%) (omitted reference group).

Life Course Variables
Marital Status
Married baseline Dummy variable 1=Married, 0=otherwise.
Never married baseline Dummy variable 1=Never married,
0=otherwise.
Divorced baseline Dummy variable 1=Divorced, 0=otherwise.
Widowed baseline Dummy variable 1=Widowed,
0=otherwise.
Children
Continuous variable indicating the number
of children living with the respondent.
Spouse/partner in Nursing Home
Dummy variable 1 = Spouse/partner in a
nursing home, 0=otherwise.
Marital disruption
Divorced Dummy variable 1=Respondent is divorced
in the past two years, 0=otherwise.
Widowed Dummy variable 1=Respondent is
widowed in the past two years,
0=otherwise.
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Health Shock
Respondent Incidence Mild* Dummy variable 1=Respondent reports
mild health condition after baseline,
0=otherwise.
Spouse Incidence Mild* Dummy variable 1=Spouse/partner reports
mild health condition after baseline,
0=otherwise or no spouse/partner.
Spouse Incidence Severe** Dummy variable 1=Spouse/partner reports
severe health condition after baseline,
0=otherwise or no spouse/partner.
Homeowner
Dummy variable 1=Respondent owns their
home, 0=otherwise.
Reached 71
Dummy variable 1= respondent is 71 years
old or older, 0=otherwise.
Secular effects Cycle
Dummy variable captures secular effects
not reflected in the time trend variable;
1=cycle, 0=otherwise. Ranges from 20002002 (cycle2) to 2006-2008 (cycle 5).
2000-2002 (cycle2) omitted reference
group.
Demographic Variables
Race
White non-Hispanic Dummy variable 1=White non-Hispanic,
0=otherwise.
Black non-Hispanic Dummy variable 1=Black non-Hispanic,
0=otherwise.
Other non-Hispanic Dummy variable 1=Other non-Hispanic,
0=otherwise.
Hispanic Dummy variable 1=Hispanic, 0=otherwise.
Age
Age in years at baseline (1998), centered
around 60.
Female
Dummy variable indicating gender.
Female=1, male=0.
Educational Attainment
Less than high school Dummy variable 1= Less than high school,
0=otherwise.
High school Dummy variable 1= High school,
0=otherwise.
Some college Dummy variable 1= Some college,
0=otherwise.
College Dummy variable 1= College, 0=otherwise.
Masters Dummy variable 1= Masters, 0=otherwise.
Sector
White collar job Dummy variable 1=Longest held job is in
white collar sector, 0=otherwise.
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Blue collar job Dummy variable 1=Longest held job is in
blue collar sector, 0=otherwise.
Service job Dummy variable 1=Longest held job is in
service sector, 0=otherwise.
Missing sector Dummy variable 1=Longest held job was
missing, 0=otherwise.
Region
Northeast Dummy variable 1=Respondent lives in
Northeast, 0=otherwise.
Midwest Dummy variable 1=Respondent lives in
Midwest, 0=otherwise.
South Dummy variable 1=Respondent lives in
South, 0=otherwise.
West Dummy variable 1=Respondent lives in
West, 0=otherwise.
Decumulation Factors
Health Capital
Respondent Prevalence Mild* Count variable of number of mild health
conditions Respondent reports.
Respondent Prevalence Severe** Count variable of number of severe health
conditions Respondent reports.
Spouse Prevalence Mild* Count variable of number of mild health
conditions Spouse/Partner reports.
Spouse Prevalence Severe** Count variable of number of mild health
conditions Spouse/Partner reports.
Income
Social Security Income Dummy variable 1=Respondent has Social
Security income, 0=otherwise.
Pension Income Dummy variable 1=Respondent has
Pension income, 0=otherwise.
Social Security Disability income Dummy variable 1=Respondent has Social
Security Disability income, 0=otherwise.
Income from earnings Dummy variable 1=Respondent has
Income from earnings, 0=otherwise.
Health Insurance
Government insurance Dummy variable 1=Respondent has
Medicare, Medicaid, veterans or other
government insurance, 0=otherwise.
Employer insurance Dummy variable 1=Respondent has
insurance through a current or past
employer, 0=otherwise.
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Other insurance Dummy variable 1=Respondent has basic
health privately purchased, supplemental
insurance (set to yes if covered by basic
health, medigap or any other health
insurance programs besides long term care,
and the coverage is not provided by the
government or an employer or union),
0=otherwise.
No insurance Dummy variable 1=Respondent does not
report having insurance, 0=otherwise.
* Mild conditions include high blood pressure, psychiatric problems and arthritis.
**Severe conditions include diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease and stroke.

Table 3.
Expected Variable Signs
Variable

Expected
Sign
DV=1
Overspender

Dependent Variable
Divest
DV
Life Course Variables
Marital Status
Married Baseline Reference
Group
Never married Baseline +
Divorced +
Baseline
Widowed +
Baseline
Children
+/Spouse/partner in Nursing +
Home
Marital disruption
Divorced +
Widowed +
Health Shock
Respondent Incidence +
Mild*
Respondent Incidence +
Severe**
Spouse Incidence Mild* +

Expected
Sign
DV=2
Oversaver
DV

Reference
Group
+/-

-
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Spouse Incidence
Severe**
Homeowner
Reached 71
Secular Effects Cycle
Demographic Variables
Race
White non-Hispanic

+

-

+/+/+/-

+/+/+/-

Reference
Group
Black non-Hispanic +
Other non-Hispanic +
Hispanic +
Age
+
Female
+
Educational Attainment
Less than high school Reference
Group
High school Some college College Masters Sector
White collar job Reference
Group
Blue collar job +
Service job +
Missing Sector +/Region
Northeast Reference
Group
Midwest South West Decumulation Factors
Health Capital
Respondent Prevalence +
Mild*
Respondent Prevalence +
Severe**
Spouse Prevalence Mild* +
Spouse Prevalence +
Severe**
Income
Social Security +/Pension Income +/-

Reference
Group
Reference
Group
+
+
+
+
Reference
Group
+/Reference
Group
+
+
+

-

+/+/-
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Social Security Disability +/+/Income
Income from earnings +/+/Health Insurance
Government Insurance +
Employer Insurance +
Other +
Insurance
No Insurance +
* Mild conditions include high blood pressure,
psychiatric problems and arthritis.
**Severe conditions include diabetes, cancer,
lung disease, heart disease and stroke.

Decumulation Pattern Analysis
After examining movement across outcome categories over time, the next step
was to determine the most common patterns of asset drawdown. A variable called divest
pattern was created to record the dependent variable outcome category for each period of
observation using an integer with up to five digits. Each digit represents the result from
one period. The first result is recorded in the right most digit and subsequent results are
stored in adjacent digits from right to left. A digit is assigned a value of 1 for
overspender, 2 for oversaver, and 3 for on target. For example, the pattern for five
periods is represented as 1,3,2,1,3; 3 for on target (1998-2000), 1 for overspender (20002002), 2 for oversaver (2002-2004), 3 for on target (2004-2006) and 1 for overspender
(2006-2008). Frequencies for the divest pattern variable were run for all households
regardless of how many waves of data were present. Analytic results are found in
Chapter 5.
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Markov Models
A set of multinomial logistic regressions were estimated to analyze factors that
influence transitions across outcome categories. A Markov model is used to represent a
changing set of states over time, where there is a known probability or rate of transition
from one state to another. The model assumes that the probability of an observation at
time n depends only on the observation at time n-1 (known as a first order Markov
assumption) (Fosler-Lussier, 1998). Due to their simplicity Markov models are typically
used as a building block of a larger analysis (Agresti, A. & Finlay, B., 1999).
Before specifying the Markov models, I coded a variable (lagdivest) that is the
divest outcome from the previous period. With the exception of the dependent variables,
the MNL variables and Markov model variables are identical.
Three additional models were specified, one for each of the three categories of the
lagdivest dependent variable. To facilitate comparison across models, on target was
specified as the base outcome in each of the three models. Relative risk ratios and
confidence intervals are displayed for all re-estimated models.
First I re-estimated the original mnl regression model for cases where lagdivest
was equal to on target. Next the model was re-estimated to include cases where lagdivest
was equal to overspender. Finally, the mnl regression model was again re-estimated, this
time for cases where lagdivest was equal to oversaver. Results for these models are
displayed in Chapter 5.
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Post Hoc Tests
I tested the sensitivity of the multinomial logistic regression empirical results to
alternative assumptions regarding variable measurement and specification, economic
cycle, life expectancy, and wealth expectations. The first model used a five-point scale
(excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor) as a measure of self-reported health. Within
this sample a change of 2 points between waves (for example, from excellent at baseline
to good at wave 2) was observed for greater than 5% of respondents thus it is considered
a negative change in health status. The second model used a measure of functional status
based on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services RAI 3.0 manual, v1.09. The
onset of Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) (baseline=0 ADLS reported to ADLs=1 at any
wave) or an increase of 2 or more ADLs between waves (for example, Wave 3 ADLs=2,
Wave 4 ADLs=4) were both used as indicators of a negative change to health.
I tested an alternative assumption of the economic cycle by specifying the model
over a period with different economic stages (2000-2006) from those in the study (19982008). Household time preferences for consumption were tested by including a life
expectancy variable in the model. Results of all the sensitivity analyses are discussed in
the Results chapter; details of the analyses can be found in Appendix C.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS

This paper focused on the rate and determinants of asset drawdown in later life.
In this section I first examine characteristics of the dataset to be analyzed. Next a
multinomial logistic model is estimated to identify predictors of decumulation rates over
the time period 1998 – 2008.
Descriptive Analysis of Multinomial Logistic Regression Sample
The study sample for the multinomial model contains 30,100 person wave
observations. The majority of this sample is white non-Hispanic (84.6%), with black
non-Hispanic respondents comprising 12.6% and other non-Hispanic less than 3%. The
average respondent is nearly 71 years old at baseline. Nearly two-thirds are female
(62%); most have a high school diploma or less education (66%). Almost 40% reported
living in the south. Of those reporting a longest held occupation sector, most were
employed in service jobs (27%).
Regarding life course variables, more than half the sample was married at
baseline (65%), while 25% was widowed. Nearly 5% of the sample became widows over
the period of study, and more than 28% had an adult child living with them at some point
in time. At baseline, 11.7% of respondents indicated a mild health shock and 14.4%
reported a severe health shock.
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The overwhelming majority of this group reported having some type of
government insurance (96%); many had additional insurance (26%) or insurance from a
current or former employer (36%) while less than one percent reported being uninsured.
Income sources were varied; nearly all respondents (96%) had income from social
security; 15% worked for pay after baseline and 56% were receiving pension benefits.
Table 4.
Descriptive Statistics Multinomial Logistic Regression Sample
Variable
Life Course Variables
Marital Status
Married Baseline
Never married Baseline
Divorced
Baseline
Widowed
Baseline
Children
Spouse/partner in Nursing
Home
Marital disruption
Divorced
Widowed
Health Shock
Respondent Incidence Mild*
Respondent Incidence
Severe**
Spouse Incidence Mild*
Spouse Incidence Severe**
Homeowner
Reached 71
2000-2002
2002-2004
2004-2006
2006-2008
Demographic Variables
Race
White non-Hispanic
Black non-Hispanic
Other non-Hispanic
Hispanic

Mean

Standard Deviation

.644
.026

.479
.160

.082

.275

.247
.285

.431
.616

.006

.075

.009
.048

.097
.214

.117

.319

.144
.055
.068
.784
.519
.311
.256
.219
.215

.374
.237
.277
.411
.500
.463
.436
.413
.411

.846
.126
.029
.072

.361
.332
.167
.259
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Age
10.463
6.919
Female
.621
.485
Educational Attainment
Less than high school
.312
.463
High school
.350
.477
Some college
.173
.379
College
.082
.274
Masters
.083
.276
Sector
White collar job
.192
.394
Blue collar job
.187
.390
Service job
.273
.446
Missing Sector
.347
.476
Region
Northeast
.167
.373
Midwest
.259
.438
South
.387
.487
West
.185
.388
Decumulation Factors
Health Capital
Respondent Prevalence
Mild*
1.358
.834
Respondent Prevalence
Severe**
.848
.929
Spouse Prevalence Mild*
.722
.890
Spouse Prevalence Severe**
.469
.803
Income
Social Security
.959
.198
Pension Income
.575
.494
Social Security Disability
Income
.066
.249
Income from earnings
.148
.355
Health Insurance
Government Insurance
.958
.201
Employer Insurance
.359
.480
Other
Insurance
.259
.438
No insurance
.009
.093
* Mild conditions include high blood pressure, psychiatric problems and arthritis.
**Severe conditions include diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease and stroke.
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Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis
A multinomial logit (MNL) regression was estimated on pooled data for 1998 –
2008. The analysis was conducted to analyze Hypothesis 4 (the onset of a health
condition will predict an excessive depletion of assets), Hypothesis 5 (marital dissolution
or death of a spouse will be associated with excessive decumulation) and Hypothesis 6
(the admission of a spouse to a nursing home will be associated with excessive
decumulation). Results are displayed in table 5 below. The model was estimated with on
target as the base outcome. The regression coefficients are the relative risk ratios (RRRs)
for a unit change in the predictor variable. The substantive interpretations of the RRRs
refer to expected changes as in the concept of expected value.
Multinomial logistic regression does not have an equivalent to the ordinary least
squares R-squared, therefore many researchers use the pseudo R-squared as an indicator
of model fit. The pseudo R-squared for the multinomial regression is 0.0105. While this
pseudo R-squared value is low (common values are between 0.10 and 0.20), the statistic
should be interpreted cautiously as it does not have the same meaning as an R-squared
statistic. An R-squared summarizes the proportion of variance in the dependent variable
associated with the independent variables. When comparing R-squared values, larger
values indicate a better fit. This study estimated McFadden’s pseudo R-squared. This
statistic compares the intercept only model and the fully specified model. Although this
model’s pseudo R-squared is low, the model is superior to an intercept-only model.
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Table 5.
Empirical Results for Multinomial Logit of Divest Target Outcomes

Variables
Life Course
Variables
Marital Status
Married Baseline
Never married
Baseline
Divorced
Baseline
Widowed
Baseline
Children
Spouse/partner in
Nursing Home
Marital disruption
Divorced
Widowed
Health Shock
Respondent
Incidence Mild1
Respondent
Incidence Severe2
Spouse Incidence
Mild1
Spouse Incidence
Severe2
Homeowner
Reached 71
2000-2002
2002-2004
2004-2006
2006-2008

Overspender
(Base Outcome On
Target)
RRR
95% CI

Oversaver
(Base Outcome On
Target)
RRR
95% CI

Reference Reference Reference Reference
Group
Group
Group
Group

1.23

.56 – 1.07
1.00 –
1.52

1.24

.62 – 1.06
1.01 –
1.52*

1.10
1.00

.93 – 1.29
.93 – 1.07

1.05
1.02

.90 – 1.23
.95 – 1.09

.86

.50 – 1.47

.89

.53 – 1.49

.94

.84

.55 – 1.29

1.26

.61 – 1.43
1.00 –
1.59*

1.14

.91 – 1.43

1.04

.98 – 1.11

.92

.80 – 1.06

1.06

.98 – 1.10

1.06

.94 – 1.20

1.03

.85 – 1.25

.96

.79 – 1.15

.78

.81

.75 – 1.04
.94
.80 – 1.09
1.00 –
1.08 –
1.14
1.29
1.22
1.38**
1.06
.92 – 1.24
.99
.85 – 1.14
Reference Reference Reference Reference
Group
Group
Group
Group
1.05 –
1.19
1.34**
1.00
.89 – 1.13
.95
.84 – 1.08
.92
.82 – 1.05
1.04
.89 – 1.20
.93
.81 – 1.08
.89
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Demographic
Variables
Race
White non- Reference Reference Reference Reference
Hispanic
Group
Group
Group
Group
.53 .55 Black non-Hispanic
.62
.74**
.64
.74**
Other non-Hispanic
1.09
.79 – 1.51
.97
.71 -1.33
.41 .45 Hispanic
.52
.65**
.56
.70**
1.00 –
Age
1.00
.99 – 1.01
1.02
1.03**
1.00 Female
1.13
1.27
1.05
.94 – 1.18
Educational
Attainment
Less than high Reference Reference Reference Reference
school
Group
Group
Group
Group
High school
.92
.81 – 1.05
1.01
.90 – 1.15
.80 –
Some college
.94
1.106
1.03
.88 – 1.20
College
.89
.72 – 1.08
1.02
.85 – 1.24
Masters
.84
.68 – 1.04
1.02
.83 – 1.24
Sector
Reference Reference Reference Reference
White collar job
Group
Group
Group
Group
1.08 –
1.06 –
Blue collar job
1.29
1.55**
1.25
1.48**
1.01 –
1.01 –
Service job
1.19
1.39*
1.18
1.37*
1.03 –
Missing Sector
1.15
.98 – 1.36
1.21
1.41*
Region
Reference Reference Reference Reference
Northeast
Group
Group
Group
Group
Midwest
.91
.78 - 1.06
.95
.82 – 1.10
South
.98
.84 – 1.13
.97
.84 – 1.11
West
1.03
.86 – 1.23
1.04
.88 -1.22
Decumulation
Factors
Health Capital
Respondent
Prevalence Mild1
1.04
.98 – 1.11
1.02
.96 – 1.09
Respondent
Prevalence Severe2
1.04
.98 – 1.10
1.04
.99 – 1.10
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Spouse Prevalence
Mild1
Spouse Prevalence
Severe2
Income
Social Security
Pension Income

1.01

.94 – 1.09

1.00

.93 – 1.07

.97

.90 – 1.04

.99

.93 – 1.06

1.18

1.19

.96 – 1.48

.96

1.28

.93 – 1.50
.80 .99**
.41 .62**
1.10 –
1.48**

1.35

.87 – 1.07
.43 .64**
1.17 –
1.56**

1.04

.79 – 1.37

1.05

.81 – 1.38

1.03

.91 – 1.16

1.09

.97 – 1.22

1.00
1.46

.88 – 1.14
.80 – 2.67

1.04
1.17

.93 – 1.18
.66 – 2.08

.89
Social Security
Disability Income
Income from
earnings
Health Insurance
Government
Insurance
Employer
Insurance
Other
Insurance
No insurance

.50

.52

Pseudo R2
0.0105
n=23,569
RRR=Relative Risk Ratio, CI=Confidence Interval
1. Mild conditions include high blood pressure, psychiatric problems and arthritis.
2. Severe conditions include diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease and stroke.
*p<0.05
**p<0.01

Analysis of the life course variables suggests that if a respondent experienced
widowhood during the study the relative risk of overspender relative to on target would
increased by a factor of 1.26 given the other variables in the model are held constant.
Effects from 2002-2004 (cycle3) increased the relative risk of overspender (1.19). The
sign for the widow variable was consistent with expectations; the cycle variable sign was
not specified. None of the other life course variables predicted divest rates. It is possible
that the health variables did not predict overspender since this sample has a high degree
of insurance coverage.
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If a respondent reported being divorced at baseline the relative risk of oversaver
relative to on target increased by a factor of 1.24, holding all other model variables
constant. Similarly, if a respondent owns a home, the relative risk of oversaver increased
by a factor of 1.22. Being divorced at baseline decreased the risk of oversaver; the effect
of homeowner was uncertain. Taking into account the average age of the respondent at
baseline (71) and gender (mostly female) they would not be expected to return to the
workforce in large numbers to compensate for diminished net worth after marital
dissolution. Perhaps this led those divorced at baseline to spend conservatively. This is
an area for future research. Contrary to expectations none of the other variables predicted
divesting.
Several of the demographic factors are predictors of household decumulation
rates. An increase in age is associated with oversaver (RRR = 1.05; p<.01). Not
surprisingly the results suggest that longest held occupation sector predicts draw down
rates. Having held a blue collar or service job (relative to white collar) increased the
relative risk of overspender by a factor of 1.29 and 1.19, respectively. It was also
associated with an increased risk of oversaver by a factor of 1.25 for blue collar, 1.18 for
service jobs and 1.21 for missing sector. Blue collar and service sector occupations
predicted contrary to what was expected for oversaver. Even though pension income is
controlled for, it is possible that the results are still picking up the effect.
Being black or Hispanic relative to white is also predictive of both overspender
and oversaver. An examination of the results shows that being a member of either racial
group decreases the risk of overspender and oversaver relative to whites. This result is
unexpected; it is explored in later sections of the dissertation.
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Finally, the following decumulation factors were associated with divesting rates.
Having income from a pension or social security disability (SSDI) were associated with
lower risk of overspender, whereas income from earnings was associated with
overspender. It is plausible that those with disability and pension income were
conservative with spending given the likelihood of future pension benefit cuts and the
small benefit amount provided by SSDI. It is also possible that the purpose of
employment was to obtain employer health insurance and increased income was a
secondary motivation; this is an area for future research.
Hypothesis 4 was not supported; the onset of a health condition did not predict an
excessive decumulation of assets. This finding is unexpected as prior research has
suggested a link between health shocks and depletion. This result may in part be
explained by the high degree of medical insurance coverage reported by this sample.
Given the age of the sample, the relative size of the coefficients indicating onset of
conditions is not large. It is possible that the change in health related consumption needs
could be large for those households experiencing onset but the effect is not significant
when averaged across the sample. The results provide mixed support for Hypothesis 5,
death of spouse was associated with overspending however marital dissolution was not
significant. The empirical results did not support Hypothesis 6, admission of a spouse to
a nursing home was not a significant predictor for overspender. Taking into
consideration the average age of the sample, it is possible that households were
anticipating that at least one member would be admitted to a nursing home, and planned
accordingly.
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Given market performance during the period under study it is possible that
unexpected gains were experienced by some households therefore unintentional saving
could have occurred. It may be the case that the intended drawdown strategy was
implemented and executed well, however asset balances exceeded expectations and no
alteration to the drawdown plan was made. This could result in a household being
classified as oversaver even though its plan would otherwise have led it to be classified as
on target.
I ran a Wald test for combining alternatives. The null hypothesis is that all
coefficients except intercepts associated with a given pair of alternatives are 0 (i.e.,
alternatives can be combined). Based on the results below the null hypothesis can be
rejected; no alternatives can be combined.
Table 6.
Wald Tests for Combining Alternatives Multinomial Logit
Alternatives Tested
Oversavers – On
Target
Oversavers –
Overspenders
On Target Overspenders

χ2

df

P> χ2

246.965

43

0.000

172.060

43

0.000

216.930

43

0.000

Model Diagnostics
I ran a variance inflation (VIF) test to examine how much of the variance in the
coefficients is inflated due to colinearity. I used the postestimation command estat VIF
after regress. The VIF can range from 1.0 to infinity. The tolerance (1/VIF) ranges from
0.0 to 1.0 where the absence of colinearity is 1.0.
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The variable measuring whether or not the respondent had reached the age of 71
in any wave had the highest VIF (2.77) and 1/VIF (0.36). Following O’Brien (2007)
these values are within acceptable limits therefore there does not appear to be a
colinearity problem with the model. See table 13 in Appendix A for the full VIF output.
The longest held occupation sector variable was missing a large number of cases
(19,476). There were no potential substitutes in the dataset for this variable, and it was
the only variable in the pooled dataset to have a large number of missing cases. The
analysis was performed using STATA (which uses listwise deletion) thus to exclude
cases missing sector data from analysis would have greatly reduced the sample size.
Therefore, a missing data indicator dummy variable was coded for the longest held
sector.
To analyze potential bias, descriptive statistics for the missing sector cases and
the MNL final sample were run; these are contained in Appendix B. Examining the
missing sector mean values we see that those missing sector are older (~78 years old vs.
~71) and a larger percent are female (72% vs. 62%).
Given their age and gender, the missing sector group is less likely than the MNL
sample to have worked for pay outside the home. Additionally, homemaker is not an
option for longest held occupation sector. It is likely that either respondents were not
asked about longest held sector or that they did not provide a valid response survey.
Since longest held sector is not a key independent variable this difference may not be
substantively important.
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Descriptive Analysis of Longitudinal Patterns
I ran the STATA xttrans procedure to test independence of outcomes in
successive time periods. The outcome probabilities are presented as a transition matrix
(see Table7), with sample numbers on the first line and percents below. For example, the
elements of the first row represent the probabilities of moving to different states or
remaining in the current state if state=1. State 1= overspender, state 2= oversaver, and
state 3= on target. This analysis was undertaken to examine Hypothesis 2 (it is difficult
to manage assets in retirement therefore it is expected that households will transition
among decumulation outcome categories).
Through examination of the probabilities several patterns emerge. Of the
households that overspent, most are likely to become oversavers in the next observation
period (61%). Only 10% are expected to be on target and 29% can be expected to
continue to overspend. Oversaving households show a similar pattern. While slightly
more than a third will once again oversave, 56% will overspend and 11% will be on
target. Nearly 30% of the households with on target spending for the current time period
will be in the same category in the next period and greater than 40% will be oversavers;
the remaining 27% are expected to overspend.
Table 7.
Estimated Transition Probabilities between Divestiture States for Successive Data Waves

Divest Status
(Wave t)
Overspender
Oversaver
On Target

Overspender
2,539
28.61
5,706
53.93
787
27.16

Divest Status (Wave t+1)
Oversaver
On Target
5,444
61.34
3,716
35.12
1,249
43.10
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892
10.05
1,159
10.95
862
29.74

Total
8,875
100.00
10,581
100.00
2,898
100.00

Total

9,032
40.40

10,409
46.56

2,913
13.03

22,354
100.00

Each wave a household would transition to a (possibly) new decumulation
outcome based on the probabilities in Table 7. Similar to Fosler-Lussier (1998), these
probabilities can be used to draw a probabilistic finite state automaton (see figure 3
below).

29.74

35.12

43.10

On Target

Oversaver
10.95

10.50

61.34

27.16

53.93

Overspender

28.61

Figure 3. Probabilistic Finite State Automaton

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relationship
between outcomes in successive periods. Based on the results (χ2 (4) = 2,300, p<.001)
the null hypothesis is rejected. The next period divest outcome probabilities differ
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depending upon the last period’s actual divest outcome. These results support
Hypothesis 2; households can be expected to transition among outcome categories. If a
household overspent in a wave, they tend to adjust and oversave in the next wave.
Decumulation Pattern Analysis
Having verified that there is movement across outcome categories over time, the
next step was to determine the most common patterns of asset drawdown. Frequencies
for the divest pattern variable were run for all households regardless of how many waves
of data were present. The five most common patterns and their valid percents were
determined; results are displayed in table 8 and figure 4 below.
Table 8.
Decumulation Patterns
Decumulation
Numerical
Pattern
2,1,2
1,2,1
1,1,2
1,2,1,2
2,1,1

Decumulation Pattern Description
Oversaver-overspender-oversaver
Overspender-oversaver-overspender
Oversaver-oversaver-overspender
Oversaver-overspender-oversaver-overspender
Overspender-oversaver-oversaver

Valid Percent
8.0
6.1
4.8
4.3
3.9

From the results of the analysis we see that there is a great variety in
decumulation patterns for households in this study, providing support for Hypothesis 1
(decumulation patterns will vary across households; it is expected that household draw
down rates will vary with time). It is interesting to note that of the top five patterns that
emerged, no households were categorized as on target. It appears that oversavers are
most likely to be overspenders and oversavers become overspenders in the following
period. However, results should be interpreted with caution. It is not clear whether
households are overshooting and undershooting short-term adjustments to be on target in
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the short-term or if they over-adjust in an attempt to get to a long term on target draw
down.

t+3
t+2
Wave
t+1
t
8.0

6.1

4.8

4.3

3.9

Valid percent of sample
Legend
= oversave

= overspend

Figure 4. Overspending and Oversaving Patterns by Wave
Markov Models
While the above analyses tell us that households transition across outcome
categories they did not provide any insight regarding factors that influence transitions.
To examine what factors explain the over-adjustments in Table 7, I ran a series of
Markov models. Before specifying the Markov models, I coded a variable (lagdivest)
that is the divest outcome from the previous period.
Three additional models were specified, one for each of the three categories of the
lagdivest dependent variable. To facilitate comparison across models, on target was
specified as the base outcome in each of the three models. Relative risk ratios and
confidence intervals are displayed for all re-estimated models.
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First I re-estimated the original MNL regression model for cases where lagdivest
was equal to on target. Results for this model are displayed in table 9.

Table 9.
Empirical Results for Markov Model of Lagdivest Target Outcome = On Target

Variable
Life Course Variables
Marital Status
Married Baseline
Never married Baseline
Divorced
Baseline
Widowed
Baseline
Children
Spouse/partner in
Nursing Home
Marital disruption
Divorced
Widowed
Health Shock
Respondent Incidence
Mild1
Respondent Incidence
Severe2
Spouse Incidence Mild1
Spouse Incidence Severe2
Homeowner
Reached 71
2002-2004
2004-2006
2006-2008
Demographic Variables
Race
White non-Hispanic
Black non-Hispanic

Overspender
RRR
95% CI

Oversaver
RRR
95% CI

Reference
Group
.42

Reference
Group
.18 - .99*

Reference
Group
1.10

Reference
Group
.62 – 1.98

1.10

.58 – 2.09

.92

.51 – 1.65

.72
1.15

.45 – 1.17
.90 – 1.47

.54
1.08

.35 - .84**
.86 – 1.35

2.37

.25 – 22.84

2.11

.28 – 16.11

2.17

1.29

.47 – 3.57

2.52

.81 – 5.83
1.42 –
4.48**

1.27

.72 – 2.24

1.59

.98 – 2.58

1.14

.71 – 1.82

1.16
2.05
1.10
1.56
1.04
Reference
Group

1.23
1.83
1.27
2.30
1.12
Reference
Group

.86 – 1.76
.89 – 3.78
.76 – 2.12
1.62 – 3.25**
.74 – 1.68
Reference
Group

1.65
.93

.79 – 1.71
.97 – 4.32
.62 – 1.93
1.05 – 2.29*
.67 – 1.62
Reference
Group
1.18 –
2.31**
.59 – 1.47

1.47
1.35

1.07 – 2.01*
.87 – 2.10

Reference
Group
.32

Reference
Group
.20 - .52**

Reference
Group
.56

Reference
Group
.37 - .83**
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Other non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Age
Female
Educational Attainment
Less than high school
High school
Some college
College
Masters
Sector
White collar job
Blue collar job
Service job
Missing Sector

.51
.18
.99
1.23

.21 – 1.26
.10 - .33**
.96 – 1.02
.84 – 1.78

1.35
.31
1.02
1.12

.69 – 2.62
.19 - .50**
.99 – 1.05
.80 – 1.58

Reference
Group
.87
1.44
1.33
1.35

Reference
Group
.59 – 1.29
.87 – 2.37
.71 – 2.50
.70 – 2.60

Reference
Group
1.12
1.60
1.28
1.65

Reference
Group
.87 – 1.60
1.01 – 2.53*
.70 – 2.32
.92 – 2.95

Reference
Group
1.41
1.15
1.11

Reference
Group
.83 – 2.41
.71 – 1.85
.69 – 1.77

Reference
Group
1.38
1.01
1.05

Reference
Group
.85 – 2.23
.66 – 1.54
.69 – 1.59

Reference
Group
.73
.81
.87

Reference
Group
.46 – 1.15
.54 – 1.22
.53 – 1.42

Reference
Group
.69
.72
.71

Reference
Group
.46 – 1.05
.49 – 1.04
.44 – 1.12

.96

.80 – 1.15

.91

.78 – 1.07

1.07
.83

.92 – 1.25
.67 – 1.03

.99
.77

.86 – 1.14
.63 - .93**

.93

.76 – 1.14

.93

.78 – 1.11

1.05
1.26

.52 – 2.10
.90 – 1.76

.86
1.27

.50 – 1.48
.93 – 1.73

.57
1.53

.32 – 1.02
.99 – 2.38

.46
.97

.29 - .73**
.63 – 1.49

.66
1.21

.16 – 2.79
.82 – 1.80

.55
1.20

.14 – 2.11
.83 – 1.74

1.12
.30

.75 – 1.68
.03 – 3.04

1.11
.29

.77 – 1.62
.04 – 1.94

Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Decumulation Factors
Health Capital
Respondent Prevalence
Mild1
Respondent Prevalence
Severe2
Spouse Prevalence Mild1
Spouse Prevalence
Severe2
Income
Social Security
Pension Income
Social Security Disability
Income
Income from earnings
Health Insurance
Government Insurance
Employer Insurance
Other
Insurance
No insurance
Pseudo R2

0.0994
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Note: n=2,088
Note: RRR=Relative Risk Ratio, CI=Confidence Interval
1. Mild conditions include high blood pressure, psychiatric problems and arthritis.
2. Severe conditions include diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease and stroke.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
Next the model was re-estimated to include cases where lagdivest was equal to
overspender. Results for this model are displayed in table 10.
Table 10.
Empirical Results for Markov Model of Lagdivest Target Outcome = Overspender

Variable
Life Course Variables
Marital Status
Married Baseline
Never married Baseline
Divorced
Baseline
Widowed
Baseline
Children
Spouse/partner in
Nursing Home
Marital disruption
Divorced
Widowed
Health Shock
Respondent Incidence
Mild1
Respondent Incidence
Severe2
Spouse Incidence Mild1
Spouse Incidence Severe2
Homeowner
Reached 71
2002-2004
2004-2006
2006-2008
Demographic Variables
Race
White non-Hispanic

Overspender
RRR
95% CI

RRR

Oversaver
95% CI

Reference
Group
1.08

Reference
Group
.55 – 2.13

Reference
Group
1.03

Reference
Group
.55 – 1.95

1.25

.81 – 1.92

1.36

.91 – 2.04

1.12
.93

.82 – 1.54
.79 – 1.09

1.04
1.04

.77 – 1.40
.90 – 1.20

.45

.10 – 2.01

.93

.26 – 3.39

1.21
1.28

.43 – 3.39
.77 – 2.12

.88
1.09

.33 – 2.37
. 67 – 1.77

.92

.68 – 1.24

.78

.59 – 1.04

1.15
.70
.84
.66
1.25
Reference
Group
.83
1.14

.88 – 1.50
.46 – 1.06
.60 – 1.17
.50 - .87**
.90 – 1.74
Reference
Group
.65 – 1.06
.83 – 1.56

1.22
.77
.95
.84
1.11
Reference
Group
.93
1.07

.95 – 1.56
.53 – 1.12
.70 – 1.28
.65 – 1.09
.82 – 1.51
Reference
Group
.74 – 1.16
.80 – 1.44

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

Reference
Group
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Black non-Hispanic
Other non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Age
Female
Educational Attainment
Less than high school
High school
Some college
College
Masters
Sector
White collar job
Blue collar job
Service job
Missing Sector

.91
1.64
.79
.99
.98

.65 – 1.25
.89 – 3.03
.49 – 1.25
.97 – 1.02
.77 – 1.26

.88
1.27
.87
1.02
1.01

.65 – 1.19
.68 – 2.37
.56 – 1.34
1.00 – 1.05
.81 – 1.27

Reference
Group
.82
.93
.69
.70

Reference
Group
.63 – 1.07
.67 – 1.30
.45 – 1.05
.43 – 1.12

Reference
Group
.86
.92
.83
.83

Reference
Group
.67 – 1.10
.69 – 1.25
.56 – 1.23
.54 – 1.29

Reference
Group
1.28
1.29
1.34

Reference
Group
.89 – 1.83
.94 – 1.78
.94 – 1.92

Reference
Group
1.20
1.20
1.35

Reference
Group
.86 – 1.66
.90 – 1.61
.97 – 1.88

Reference
Group
.65
.78
.97

Reference
Group
.47 - .89**
.58 – 1.06
.68 – 1.40

Reference
Group
1.20
1.20
1.35

Reference
Group
.86 – 1.66
.90 – 1.61
.97 – 1.88

1.07

.94 – 1.22

1.01

.90 – 1.14

1.14
.93

1.01 – 1.28*
.80 – 1.08

1.12
.95

1.00 – 1.26*
.83 – 1.09

1.19

1.02 – 1.40*

1.19

1.03 – 1.37*

.85
.74

.43 – 1.70
.59 - .92**

.62
.78

.33 – 1.16
.63 - .96*

.78

.48 – 1.25

.79

.50 – 1.23

1.15

.86 – 1.54

1.34

1.02 – 1.76*

1.04
1.15

.35 – 3.07
.89 – 1.49

1.06
1.29

.38 – 2.91
1.02 – 1.63*

1.06

.82 – 1.38

1.07

.84 – 1.36

Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Decumulation Factors
Health Capital
Respondent Prevalence
Mild1
Respondent Prevalence
Severe2
Spouse Prevalence Mild1
Spouse Prevalence
Severe2
Income
Social Security
Pension Income
Social Security Disability
Income
Income from earnings
Health Insurance
Government Insurance
Employer Insurance
Other
Insurance
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No insurance

.43 – 49.58

4.64

.35 – 34.22

3.46

Pseudo R2
0.0169
Note: n=6,433
Note: RRR=Relative Risk Ratio, CI=Confidence Interval
1. Mild conditions include high blood pressure, psychiatric problems and arthritis.
2. Severe conditions include diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease and stroke.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01

Finally, the MNL regression model was again re-estimated, this time for cases
where lagdivest was equal to oversaver. Results for the third model are displayed in table
11 below.
Table 11.
Empirical Results for Markov Model of Lagdivest Target Outcome = Oversaver

Variable
Life Course Variables
Marital Status
Married Baseline
Never married Baseline
Divorced
Baseline
Widowed
Baseline
Children
Spouse/partner in
Nursing Home
Marital disruption
Divorced
Widowed
Health Shock
Respondent Incidence
Mild1
Respondent Incidence
Severe2
Spouse Incidence Mild1
Spouse Incidence Severe2
Homeowner
Reached 71

Overspender
RRR
95% CI

RRR

Oversaver
95% CI

Reference
Group
1.01

Reference
Group
.59 – 1.73

Reference
Group
.97

Reference
Group
.54 – 1.72

1.36

1.38

.95 – 2.00

1.66
1.06

.94 – 1.94
1.27 –
2.18**
.92 – 1.22

1.69
1.07

1.29 – 2.23**
.93 – 1.24

2.27

.65 – 7.89

1.61

.46 – 5.67

.82
1.16

.32 – 2.10
.75 – 1.79

.83
1.24

.31 – 2.56
.79 – 1.95

1.04

.81 – 1.33

.90

.69 – 1.18

.93
1.10
.81
.97
1.10

.75 – 1.14
.81 – 1.50
.63 – 1.04
.77 – 1.21
.84 – 1.45

.97
1.06
.88
.88
1.06

.78 – 1.21
.76 – 1.48
.68 – 1.15
.70 – 1.11
.80 – 1.41
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2002-2004
2004-2006
2006-2008
Demographic Variables
Race
White non-Hispanic
Black non-Hispanic
Other non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Age
Female
Educational Attainment
Less than high school
High school
Some college
College
Masters
Sector
White collar job
Blue collar job
Service job
Missing Sector

Reference
Group
1.16
.95

Reference
Group
.89 – 1.51
.71 – 1.28

Reference
Group
1.06
.97

Reference
Group
.81 – 1.40
.71 – 1.31

Reference
Group
.86
1.23
1.30
1.00
1.08

Reference
Group
.65 – 1.14
.70 – 2.15
.85 – 1.99
.97 – 1.01
.89 – 1.31

Reference
Group
.84
.78
1.55
1.01
.94

Reference
Group
.62 – 1.14
.41 – 1.51
1.02 – 2.37*
.99 – 1.03
.77 – 1.15

Reference
Group
.82
.75
.70
.70

Reference
Group
.66 – 1.03
.57 - .98*
.51 - .98*
.50 - .98*

Reference
Group
.89
.82
.74
.84

Reference
Group
.71 – 1.23
.63 – 1.08
.53 – 1.04
.59 – 1.20

Reference
Group
1.10
1.07
1.18

Reference
Group
.83 – 1.46
.83 – 1.37
.92 – 1.53

Reference
Group
1.09
1.18
1.29

Reference
Group
.81 – 1.46
.91 – 1.52
.99 – 1.69

Reference
Group
.70
.97
.77

Reference
Group
.55 - .90**
.76 – 1.24
.59 – 1.01

Reference
Group
.74
1.02
.89

Reference
Group
.57 - .95*
.79 – 1.31
.67 – 1.18

1.04

.94 – 1.16

1.04

.93 – 1.15

.97
1.05

.88 – 1.06
.93 – 1.17

.98
1.03

.89 – 1.07
.92 – 1.16

.91

.81 – 1.01

.96

.86 – 1.07

.74
.74

.43 – 1.27
.62 - .89**

.84
.86

.49 – 1.45
.71 – 1.04

.70

.46 – 1.08

.64

.41 – 1.00

Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Decumulation Factors
Health Capital
Respondent Prevalence
Mild1
Respondent Prevalence
Severe2
Spouse Prevalence Mild1
Spouse Prevalence
Severe2
Income
Social Security
Pension Income
Social Security Disability
Income
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Income from earnings
Health Insurance
Government Insurance
Employer Insurance
Other
Insurance
No insurance

1.29

1.01 – 1.62*

1.38

1.08 – 1.77*

1.47
1.02

.80 – 2.71
.83 – 1.24

1.38
1.12

.69 – 2.75
.92 – 1.38

.95
1.94

.77 – 1.17
.37 – 10.32

.96
1.21

.78 – 1.20
.22 – 6.75

Pseudo R2
0.0139
Note: n=7,725
Note: RRR=Relative Risk Ratio, CI=Confidence Interval
1. Mild conditions include high blood pressure, psychiatric problems and arthritis.
2. Severe conditions include diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease and stroke.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01

An analysis of results across these models shows that coefficients and
significance levels of variables differ by recent depletion experience. For those who were
oversavers in the previous wave, the relative risk for overspender relative to on target for
those widowed at baseline increased by a factor of 1.66, while the risk for oversaver
relative to on target increased by a factor of 1.69. However, for those widowed at
baseline who were on target in the previous wave the relative risk for oversaver relative
to on target decreased by .54, given all other variables in the model are held constant.
For those who oversaved in the previous wave, owning a home decreased the risk
of overspender relative to on target by a factor of .66 (p<.01); for those who were on
target in the prior wave the risk of overspender relative to on target increased by a factor
of 1.56 (p<.05) and increased the risk of oversaver relative to on target by a factor of 2.30
(p<.01).
Racial identity demonstrated sensitivity to the analysis as well. For respondents
identifying as Hispanic relative to otherwise similar whites the relative risk of on target
versus oversaver decreased by a factor of .31 (p<.01) when the previous wave category
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was on target, overspender relative to on target decreased by .18 (p<.01) when the
previous wave category was on target, while the relative risk of oversaver relative to on
target increased by a factor of 1.55 (p<.05) for those who were oversavers in the prior
wave. Results suggest that being Hispanic lowers the risk of leaving a specific
categorization once it is achieved.
Respondents living in the Midwest who were overspenders in the previous wave
decreased the risk of overspender relative to on target by a factor of .65 (p<.01); the
decreased risk for oversaver relative to on target is .74 (p<.05) relative to those living in
the Northeast. The risk for Midwest residents of being in overspender versus on target
decreased by a factor of .70 (p<.01), and by a factor of .74 (p<.05) for oversaver relative
to on target if their previous wave was oversaver.
The goodness of fit indicator used to evaluate the model (pseudo R-squared)
suggests that there is different predictive ability across models. While the pseudo Rsquared values for the models with overspender and oversaver specified as the outcome
in the prior observation periods are comparable (0.0169 and 0.0139 respectively) the on
target value is much higher (0.0994). Based on the pseudo R-square measure of model fit
the model conditional on being on target has a much better model fit.
Figure 5 below is a pictorial representation of all significant variables in any of
the three Markov models. This depiction will help to identify patterns of transitions.
Variables predicting a decreased risk of assignment to the category are noted with a “-“
and those predicting an increased risk of assignment to a category are noted with a “+”.
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11 7+
2+

2 -4+
5+
6 -7 -8+
13 -16 --

On Target

17 +

Oversaver

15 - 17 + 18 +
11 - 12 + 14 +

1-

5+
4+
3+

6-

72+

8- 9-

10 -

17 +
11 - 15 -

Overspender

411 12 +

14 +
15 -

Legend
7. Hispanic
8. Some college
9. College
10. Masters
11. Midwest
12. Respondent prevalence severe
+ predicts increased relative risk ratio - predicts decreased relative risk ratio

1. Never married baseline
2. Widowed baseline
3. Widowed – marital disruption
4. Homeowner
5. 2004-2006
6. Black non-Hispanic

13. Spouse prevalence mild
14. Spouse prevalence severe
15. Pension Income
16. Social Security Disability Income
17. Income from earnings
18.Employer Insurance

Figure 5. Variables Significantly Predicting Decumulation Outcome Transitions
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Being single at baseline, Black or Hispanic are associated with a decreased
likelihood of transitioning from on target to overspender while the loss of a spouse,
owning a home, and the macroeconomic effects from 2004-2006 predict an increased
likelihood of on target to overspender.
Similar to the MNL, Markov model results where the prior period was an ontarget drawdown have several variables that are “dual predictors.” Owning a home and
the macroeconomic effects of 2004-2006 predict an increased risk of transitioning from
on target to oversaver and overspender. Being Black or Hispanic predict a decreased risk
of transitioning from on target to oversaver and overspender. Here we see life course
variables predicting a transition away from on target while the transition is less likely to
occur for those with certain demographic characteristics.
Being widowed at baseline, Black or Hispanic, having a spouse with a mild health
condition and Social Security Disability income all predicted a decreased likelihood of
transitioning from on target to oversaver while the macroeconomic effects from 20042006 predict an increased likelihood of transitioning from on target to oversaver. These
variables do not predict any of the oversaver/overspender transition possibilities.
Being a homeowner and living in the Midwest are associated with a decrease in
the likelihood of consecutive periods of overspending. By comparison, having either a
respondent or spouse report a severe health condition and pension income are associated
with an increased likelihood of consecutive periods of overspending.
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Living in the Midwest (relative to the North) is associated with a decrease in the
likelihood of consecutive periods of oversaving. Conversely, being widowed at baseline,
being Hispanic and having income from earnings are associated with an increased
likelihood of consecutive periods of oversaving.
Living in the Midwest, pension income, and income from earnings predict the
transition between oversaver and overspender however these variables do not predict a
transition from on target in the previous period to either overspender or oversaver.
Households with a respondent or spouse reporting a severe health condition have
an increased risk of oversaving after a period of overspending as well as overspending in
consecutive waves. However, these variables do not predict for oversaving to
overspending or consecutive periods of oversaving.
A spouse reporting a severe health condition is associated with an increased
likelihood of overspender to oversaver and overspender to overspender. Pension income
is associated with a decreased likelihood of overspender to oversaver, oversaver to
overspender and overspender to overspender.
Oversaver and overspender Markov models have “dual predictor” variables as
well. Pension income predicts a decreased risk of transitioning from oversaver to
overspender as well as a decreased risk of transitioning from overspender to oversaver.
Income from earnings predicts an increased risk of transitioning from oversaver to
overspender as well as an increased risk of transitioning from overspender to oversaver.
However, pension income is associated with an increased likelihood of overspending in
consecutive periods and income from earnings is associated with an increased likelihood
of consecutive periods of oversaving.
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A number of variables were significant predictors for exactly one transition.
Single at baseline is associated with a decreased risk of on target to overspender. Loss of
a spouse increases the risk of on target to overspender. A spouse with a mild health
condition and Social Security Disability income both predict a decreased risk of
transitioning from on target to oversaver. Finally, having a college or masters degree
decreases the risk of overspending following a period of oversaving while having
employer provided insurance increases the risk of oversaving then overspending.
Living in the Midwest is the only variable that predicts consistently (a decreased
likelihood) for overspender to oversaver, oversaver to overspender, overspender to
overspender and oversaver to oversaver.
In summary, the review of the Markov model results suggests that households do
adjust their depletion rate as a function of their last depletion rate, providing support for
Hypothesis 3.
Patterns and Variable Significance across Regression Models
Table 12 was created to facilitate variable predictive ability and patterns across
the multiple models run. This table contains the results of the Multinomial Logistic
Regression and Markov Models. All models have the same base outcome (On Target) to
facilitate comparison. An increased risk of being in a drawdown outcome category
(relative to on target) is represented by “+“. A decreased risk of being in a drawdown
category (relative to on target) is denoted by “-“. Variable significance at p <.05 level is
denoted by a “*”; significance at the p < .01 level is “**”.
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This table illustrates several interesting prediction patterns. No variables
predicted significantly for each outcome category in every model type. In the context of
a richly specified model this result is surprising. It suggests that the study of this
behavior is more nuanced than initially posited.
In a few instances variables were associated with only one of the outcome
categories of the MNL model. Divorced at baseline and age are associated with an
increased likelihood of oversaving. There were no variables with patterns of predicting
decreased likelihood of oversaving only nor was this pattern observed for overspender in
either direction.
Some model factors predict that a household will be on or off target, but not the
specific direction. They also fail to explain transitions between categories. For example,
the blue collar and service sector variables are significant for predicting a greater
likelihood of overspender and oversaver in the MNL regression.
Other model variables are associated only with transitions to/from a specific
category. Several of the health capital variables (respondent prevalence severe and
spouse prevalence severe) were associated with a higher likelihood of being an
overspender if the household overspent in the previous wave, as well as being an
oversaver in a wave following a period of overspending. The variable was not significant
in the MNL regression. These results suggest that severe health conditions are predictive
for transitioning to/from overspender once a household has been categorized as
overspender. However, it does not appear that severe health conditions influence the
initial spending categorization (MNL).
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Table 12.
Multinomial Logit and Markov Regression Results
Markov
Markov
Markov
Model
Model
Model
Lagdivest
Lagdivest
Lagdivest
Target
Target
Target
MNL
Outcome =
Outcome =
Outcome = MNL
Regression
On Target Overspender Oversaver Regression
Overspender Overspender Overspender Overspender Oversaver
(Base
(Base
(Base
(Base
(Base
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
On Target)
On Target)
On Target)
On Target)
On Target)

Markov
Model
Lagdivest
Target
Outcome =
On Target
Oversaver
(Base
Outcome
On Target)

Markov
Model
Lagdivest
Target
Outcome =
Overspender
Oversaver
(Base
Outcome On
Target)

Markov
Model
Lagdivest
Target
Outcome =
Oversaver
Oversaver
(Base
Outcome
On Target)

Variable
Life Course
Variables
Marital Status
Married Baseline
Never married
Baseline
Divorced
Baseline
Widowed
Baseline
Children
Spouse/partner in
Nursing Home
Marital disruption
Divorced
Widowed

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

-

-*

+

+

-

+

+

-

+

+

+

+

+*

-

+

+

+
+/-

+

+
-

+**
+

+
+

-**
+

+
+

+**
+

-

+

-

+

-

+

-

+

+*

+
+**

+
+

+

-

+
+

+

+
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+

Health Shock
Respondent
Incidence Mild1
Respondent
Incidence Severe2
Spouse Incidence
Mild1
Spouse Incidence
Severe2
Homeowner
Reached 71
2000-2002
2002-2004
2004-2006
2006-2008
Demographic
Variables
Race
White non-Hispanic
Black non-Hispanic
Other non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Age
Female
Educational
Attainment
Less than high school
High school
Some college

+

+

-

+

-

+

-

-

+

+

+

-

+

+

+

-

+

+

-

+

-

+

-

+

+
+
Reference
Group

+
+*
+

-**
+

+

+
+**
+

+

+

+**
+

N/A
Reference
Group
+**
-

N/A
Reference
Group
+

N/A
Reference
Group
+
-

+**
Reference
Group
+/-

N/A
Reference
Group
+*
+

N/A
Reference
Group
+

N/A
Reference
Group
+
-

Reference
Group
-**
+
-**
+/+

Reference
Group
-**
-**
+

Reference
Group
+
-

Reference
Group
+
+
+/+

Reference
Group
-**
-**
+**
+

Reference
Group
-**
+
-**
+
+

Reference
Group
+
+
+

Reference
Group
+*
+
-

Reference
Group
-

Reference
Group
+

Reference
Group
-

Reference
Group
-*

Reference
Group
+
+

Reference
Group
+
+*

Reference
Group
-

Reference
Group
-
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College
Masters

-

+
+

-

-*
-*

+
+

+
+

-

-

Reference
Group
+**
+*
+

Reference
Group
+
+
+

Reference
Group
+
+
+

Reference
Group
+
+
+

Reference
Group
+**
+*
+*

Reference
Group
+
+
+

Reference
Group
+
+
+

Reference
Group
+
+
+

Reference
Group
+

Reference
Group
-

Reference
Group
-**
-

Reference
Group
-**
-

Reference
Group
+

Reference
Group
-

Reference
Group
+
+
+

Reference
Group
-*
+
-

+

-

+

+

+

-

+

+

+

+

+*

-

+

-

+*

-

+

-

-

+

+/-

-**

-

+

-

-

+*

-

-

-

+*

-

+
-**

+
+

-**

-**

+
-

+

-*

-

-**

-

-

-

-**

-**

-

-

+**

+

+

+*

+**

-

+*

+*

Sector
White collar job
Blue collar job
Service job
Missing Sector
Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Decumulation
Factors
Health Capital
Respondent
Prevalence Mild1
Respondent
Prevalence Severe2
Spouse Prevalence
Mild1
Spouse Prevalence
Severe2
Income
Social Security
Pension Income
Social Security
Disability Income
Income from
earnings
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Health Insurance
Government
Insurance
Employer Insurance
Other
Insurance
No insurance

+
+

+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+

+
+*

+
+

+/+

+
-

+
+

+

+
+

+
-

+
+

+

Pseudo R2
0.0105
0.0994
0.0169
0.0139
0.0105
0.0994
Note: n=23,569
1. Mild conditions include high blood pressure, psychiatric problems and arthritis.
2. Severe conditions include diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease and stroke.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
+ predicts increased risk relative to base outcome, - predicts decreased risk relative to base outcome
+/- variable coefficient =1.00
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0.0169

0.0139

It is surprising to note that the health shock variables failed to predict in any of the
models. This is contrary to the large body of literature linking health shocks and changes
to decumulation as well as economic theory. These results warrant future exploration.
Having a spouse/partner enter a nursing home, getting divorced, reaching age 71, being
Other non-Hispanic, being female, living in the South or West, respondent having a mild
health condition, income from Social Security, and the majority of the insurance variables
(with the exception of having employer insurance) also failed to achieve significance in
any of the models.
Health insurance variables had little predictive ability in this study. Of the four
variables included (government insurance, employer insurance, other insurance and no
insurance) only employer insurance was significant. Having employer insurance was
associated with a greater likelihood of being classified as oversaver when the household
was classified as overspender in the previous wave.
Another pattern that emerged was significance in the MNL and Markov models as
shown by the pension income variable. The results suggest that households with pension
income appear to be managing to an on target drawdown rate. These households were
less likely to be overspenders relative to on target (MNL). They were less likely to
transition to overspender if they were overspenders or oversavers in the previous wave
and they were also more likely to oversave after a period of overspending.
Being a homeowner, Black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, and reporting Social Security
Disability income or earnings income were predictive in the models included in the study
(MNL and Markov models). Homeowners were likelier to be overspenders and
oversavers relative to on target, they were likelier to continue overspending if they were
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overspenders in the previous period, and they were likelier to oversave if they were on
target in the previous wave. The MNL and Markov results suggest homeowners are
likelier to be off target than on target.
Both Blacks and Hispanics are less likely to be oversavers or overspenders
relative to being on target and less likely to transition to overspender or oversaver when
they were previously on target. Thus, unlike homeowners, these groups appear to be
likelier to be on target than off target. One difference across these groups is that
Hispanics are likelier to be oversavers after a period of oversaving; this is not the case for
Blacks in this analysis.
Households with income from Social Security Disability are less likely to be off
target than on target. They are also less likely to transition to oversaver when they were
on target the previous period. Benefit levels for this program are fairly low and health
care costs higher than the average household thus it would be challenging to oversave.
Additionally, employment options for program beneficiaries in this age group would be
limited; therefore it is reasonable SSDI recipients would not amass large amounts of
assets from employment. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect these households would be
less likely to move to oversaver.
Finally, households reporting income from earnings are likelier to be off target
than on. Earnings income is associated with a higher likelihood of both being an
oversaver and an overspender, as well as being off target. Markov results indicate these
households are likelier to be off target in either direction after a period of oversaving as
well as moving from oversaver to overspender.
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Multinomial Logit Sensitivity Analyses
I tested the sensitivity of the primary multinomial logistic regression empirical
results to alternative assumptions regarding variable measurement and specification,
economic cycle, life expectancy, and wealth expectations. Results are found in
Appendix C.
Self-reported health data were used in this study. Some factors that may influence
self-reported health status are the severity of the disability or health condition, age of the
person with the disability, and the type of activity limitation. Therefore I examined the
issue of whether the multinomial logit results were sensitive to the choice of health
measure by estimating two additional models. The first model used a five-point scale
(excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor) as a measure of self-reported health. A
dummy variable Self-Reported Health was created where 1=2 point decline in health
status 0=otherwise.
The second model used a measure of functional status based on the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services RAI 3.0 manual, v1.09. A dummy variable ADLs was
coded 1=onset of ADL or increase of 2+ ADLs between waves, 0=otherwise.
A review of the self-reported health results indicates that there were very minor
changes to significance within the life course variables and one change to decumulation
factor variables. The pseudo R-squared value for this model is comparable to the MNL
logit (0.0105). However, a direct comparison of it with the multinomial logistic
regression should not be made due to the different sample sizes.

100

The ADL sensitivity analysis shows a similar pattern of changes to significance
for variables. The pseudo R-squared value for this model is comparable to the MNL logit
(0.0105). Again, due to sample size variations a comparison to the multinomial logistic
regression model is not valid.
Economic Cycle Effects
Economists typically study patterns of economic activity bounded by the same
phase of the business cycle (i.e. peak to peak or trough to trough). Therefore I tested an
alternative assumption of the economic cycle by specifying the model over a period with
different economic stages (2000-2006/peak to peak) from those in the primary study
(1998-2008/peak to trough).
Minor changes to life course and demographic variables are reported for the
overspender and oversaver outcomes. There were no changes to decumulation factors
predicting overspender and few changes to oversavers. Due to sample size difference
(23,569 vs. 16,233) I cannot state whether the primary multinomial logit regression or the
model with data from 2000-2006 is superior in fitting the outcome data.
In summary the model including a longevity measure showed a very modest
increase in model fit. The model fit for alternatively specified health measures and the
different economic cycle cannot be compared due to the difference in sample sizes.
Overall, for models with similar sample sizes, the coefficients and significance are close
across models, suggesting that the results are robust.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
This study identified and examined the patterns of how households decumulate
the portion of their assets that is not annuitized. First a multinomial logit model was
specified to evaluate the probability of elders’ category membership between two
dissaving strategies (oversaving and overspending) relative to being on target. The
model examined how demographic variables, life cycle factors, and decumulation factors
influenced the probabilities of selecting either dissaving category relative to being on
target. Next a decumulation pattern analysis and determination of factors influencing the
probability of being in each dissaving category were conducted. The goal is to
understand which groups are at risk for outliving their assets, which households are
decumulating at a sustainable rate, and which households are oversaving and potentially
foregoing consumption.
This chapter will describe the major findings of the study and its limitations, put
forth suggestions for future research and outline a policy directive.
Study Findings
This study examined the relationship between life course variables, demographic
factors, decumulation factors and dissaving strategies. Six main hypotheses serve as the
focus of this investigation. Hypotheses 1 through 3 are based on insights from the
conceptual model and financial literacy literature regarding the low literacy levels of
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most households. The a priori expectation was that there will be variation in drawdown
strategies households employ. Results in table 7 support Hypothesis 1. Households are
predominantly transitioning between oversaving and overspending. The next period
divest outcome probabilities differ depending upon the last period’s actual divest
outcome. Nearly 29% of the households categorized as overspenders in the current
period will be in the same category in the next period, 30% of on target households in the
current wave will be on target in the next wave and 35% of oversavers will be
categorized as oversavers at the next observation. Results as shown in table 8 support
Hypothesis 2, households can be expected to transition among outcome categories.
These patterns suggest it is difficult for households to manage to an on target asset draw
down.
Markov model results suggest that households do recalibrate their depletion rate
as a function of their last depletion rate. These results provide support for Hypothesis 3
(households are expected to have a goal of on target spending therefore the observed
cycle’s categorization will influence the next cycle’s draw down rate in an attempt to
maintain a sustainable drawdown rate).
Results for Hypotheses 1 through 3 suggest that households are willing to alter
their spending patterns. In so doing, households might be reacting to macro or micro
environmental changes. Potential macroeconomic changes include changes in interest
rates, inflation, or Social Security benefits. Possible microeconomic influences to
spending include becoming widowed or reporting income from earnings. However,
varied patterns in dissaving could also represent a “trial and error” approach to money
management. Because controls for the strategy of drawdown were not included it is not
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clear from the study why these decisions were made. Future research should explore the
drawdown decision making process.
This study hypothesized that the onset of a health condition or a spouse’s
admission to a nursing home would be associated with an excessive decumulation of
assets. These hypotheses were unsupported by the research. This is unexpected as prior
research has suggested a link between health shocks and depletion. The conceptual
model also predicts that households will adjust spending at the time of a consumption
shock. To investigate this result the model was re-estimated with different measures of
health conditions (see Appendix C). Results of the re-estimated models did not reveal
stronger effects; the health variables remained insignificant.
A possible explanation for the lack of results is that health events increased costs
for medical care however the increase was offset by decreases in other types of spending.
For example, leisure travel and entertainment expenses could be eliminated at the onset
of an illness. Members of this sample also had high levels of supplemental insurance,
which may buffer the shock of unexpected health costs.
The failure of the spousal nursing home admission to predict excessive
decumulation is puzzling. Past research has found that long term care costs are
associated with excessive depletion. Medical costs associated with an admission may
lead to overspending for those households with a spouse entering a nursing home,
however the small number of households (less than one percent) likely prevents the
variable from achieving significance. Future work remains to better understand this
result.
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Finally, marital transitions as predictors of decumulation (Hypothesis 5) were
only partially borne out by the results. Loss of spouse was associated with an increased
likelihood of overspending. Divorce was also expected to increase the likelihood of
overspender however this relationship was not significant. A small percent of the sample
reporting divorcing during the study (less than one percent) which may have contributed
to its failure to predict.
Measures of life cycle effects, demographics, and decumulation were used to
explore the determinants of the three types of mutually exclusive dissaving specified
(overspender, oversaver, on target). As expected, the life course variables predicted
differently for overspender and oversaver relative to on target. Overspenders responded
to marital disruption and macroeconomic effects; oversavers were influenced by
homeownership and baseline marital status. The demographic and decumulation
measures behaved contrary to expectations. A number of variables predicted both an
increase in the risk of oversaver and an increase in the risk of overspender relative to on
target.
In another study which looked at decumulation patterns, Hogarth (1991) also
found that some variables were providing “mixed messages” (1991, p. 117) about saving
behaviors. For example, household size was associated with both a need for higher levels
of resources and creating economies of scale.
Although there are some important differences, this study did confirm a number
of the Hogarth (1991) findings. Similar to Hogarth this study found that dissaving
patterns vary across and within households over time. It is interesting to note that
households had difficulty managing spending during the Hogarth study (1969 – 1979).
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While the predictive ability measures for this study and Hogarth’s study cannot be
directly compared, the values reported were extremely low for both studies. The studies
used different category membership criteria however it is worth noting that there were no
households in Hogarth that were consistently level spenders and in the current study only
2% of households were on target for consecutive waves. This suggests that money
management is not a skill households are developing over time. The current study was
more richly specified however there were some variables common to both studies. Of
those variables modeled in both of the studies, homeownership and change to marital
status predicted similarly across models. Becoming a widow was associated with
overspending while homeownership was associated with an increased risk of oversaving.
One of the major contributions of this study is the identification of patterns of
dissaving in retirement. Various life course, demographic and decumulation factor
variables were determinants of these patterns. These patterns had a high degree of
fluctuation. Recognizing and understanding drawdown patterns is important as this
insight can be used to both predict and shape future decumulation decisions and
behaviors.
For those households providing six survey periods of data, no households had
patterns of continuously overspending, continuously oversaving or continuously being on
target. Only 2% of the entire study sample was classified as consistently on target, 2.3%
were classified as consistently overspender and 4.1% were consistently classified as
oversavers. (To be referred as being consistently in one category a household had to be in
the same outcome category for each period in which they provided study data.) This
suggests that it is difficult for households to be on target and difficult to stay there.
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Of the five most commonly observed patterns of decumulation (representing
27.1% of the study sample), three are categorized as oversavers at the first period
measured and two are overspenders initially. None of the top five patterns identified
include a categorization of on target in any period. Finally, only oversavers have
repeated successive observations of their categories.
Results indicate that once a household has an off target decumulation period it is
unlikely they will transition to on target. It is likelier that they will transition between the
two off target categories. There is a very low probability of going from being an
oversaver to on target in the next period (10.95%) or overspender to on target (10.5%).
Once a household has been categorized as on target there is a 70% change of going away
from on target in the next period and only a 30% chance of remaining on target.
A number of factors may be influential in the formation of these patterns. The
observed patterns reported may be attributable to how the on target corridor is defined
(+/- 10% of the calculated drawdown). With a broader corridor of on target the
probability of remaining or being on target could be expected to increase. It is also
plausible that households are transitioning between off target categories in an attempt to
be on target overall but they lack the financial literacy to accomplish an on target
strategy. As the average respondent’s age is nearly 71 it is also possible cognitive decline
is contributing to these findings. Fluctuations in income, expenses, and/or asset levels
could also contribute to the dissaving patterns. The low percentage of households that
are consecutively on target coupled with the difficulty of getting to on target suggests that
how elders decumulate their assets is a problem that needs additional attention.
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In addition to identifying patterns, this study attempts to understand how those
patterns are formed. These findings indicate that different sets of variables emerged as
predictive of spending type categorization (MNL model) and/or predictive of category
transition in the next wave (Markov models).
Several of the life course variables (divorced at baseline, homeownership, and
age) predicted an increased likelihood of oversaver relative to on target. Age predicted
contrary to economic theory; a decreased likelihood of oversaver relative to on target was
the a priori expectation. Given the average age of the sample, perhaps respondents were
preserving assets in anticipation of medical bills. Benartzi (2010) reports that retirees
weight losses nearly 10 times more heavily than gains. In addition, they are five times
more loss averse than the average person. Households may be retaining assets because
they are more risk averse than gain seeking. Unfortunately the basis for these unexpected
results (divorced at baseline and homeownership predicting an increased likelihood of
oversaver relative to on target) is not clear from the research.
Demographic variables (Black non-Hispanic, Hispanic) predicted that relative to
Whites, minorities have a lower likelihood of being in the oversaver or overspender
category (relative to on target). Results suggesting that Blacks and Hispanics are less
likely to be off target than Whites are contradictory to expectations. The longest held
employment sector variables predict better for a household being off target relative to on
target, but do not provide much insight into which direction (oversaver vs. overspender).
It is difficult to provide a plausible explanation for these unexpected results.

108

A distinct set of predictors was identified for consecutive periods of overspender.
Being a homeowner and living in the Midwest were associated with a decreased
likelihood of being an overspender conditional on having been an overspender in the
previous time period. Respondent having a severe health condition, a spouse with a
severe illness, and pension income are all associated with an increased likelihood of
overspender to overspender. Having a severe health condition or a severe illness is
consistent with expectations but it is unclear why persons with pension income would
have consecutive periods of overspending.
Income from earnings predicts a greater likelihood of oversaving conditional on
having been an oversaver in the previous wave, an increased likelihood of transitioning
from overspender to oversaver in the next period and an increased likelihood of
transitioning from oversaver to overspender in the following wave. To counter the
effects of credit card, auto loan, and home mortgage debt some elders may be returning to
work. Perhaps the increase in entrepreneurs who liquidate their savings to start new
companies after retirement age is the driver behind the oversaver to overspender pattern.
Since more individuals are planning to work later in life than in previous generations it is
important to expand our understanding of how this variable predicts.
Living in the Midwest was also associated with a decreased likelihood of
oversaver to oversaver. Being widowed at baseline, being Hispanic and income from
earnings are all associated with an increased likelihood of oversaver to oversaver.
Finally, living in the Midwest is associated with both a decrease in likelihood of
overspender to overspender and decreased likelihood of oversaver to oversaver. This is
the only variable that significantly predicts both the overspender to overspender transition
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and oversaver to oversaver transition. It also predicts that Midwesterners who oversaved
in the previous period will be less likely to overspend in the next observation. This
would appear to suggest that Midwesterners are attempting to get to on target. A recent
study by Rentfrow et al. (2013) found that regions can be defined in terms of
characteristic personality profiles, and these profiles tend to cluster geographically.
These profiles are also linked to political, social, and economic metrics. According to
this study, Midwesterners can be characterized as conservative. Conservative is often
linked with fiscal responsibility thus it is possible that Midwesterners are more frugal
than other US residents and may be more inclined to manage to an on target draw down.
Additionally, according to Forbes (2012), ten of the top 20 most affordable places to live
are in the Midwest. Midwesterners have on average a lower cost of living thus it may be
easier for them to have an on target drawdown.
With the baby boomer generation beginning to enter retirement the demand for
financial products that facilitate decumulation will increase. Retirement product design
will need to accommodate declining cognitive ability, low financial literacy, and
increasing longevity. Financial service professionals will need to review and revise
existing products as well as design new products with an eye towards the needs of future
retirees. In particular, these results suggest attention should be paid to products that
facilitate an on target drawdown.
One such existing product is target date funds (also known as age-based or life
cycle funds). According to Morningstar (2013), assets invested in target date funds
exceeded $500 billion in 2013. Each fund name includes a date. Target date funds are
typically selected by the date you expect to begin dissaving (“Asset Allocation Funds,”
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2013). While target date funds are being widely used their drawdown structure is based
on life expectancy tables. Therefore as currently designed 50% of those who purchase
the product will outlive the income stream. Assisting retirees in estimating a more
accurate life expectancy would be an important first step in addressing this challenge
while using an existing product.
One approach to addressing this challenge is to base the target date fund
purchased to subjective life expectancies. Subjective life expectancies are based on
individual and family health histories. Education programs tied to workplace 401(k)
savings plans etc. can be used to instruct investors on how to estimate a subjective life
expectancy.
Overall results suggest that elders have a difficult time managing to an on target
drawdown. Having a product such as a fixed annuity as part of the retirement income
stream provides a guaranteed source of income and offers some protection against the
risk of outliving assets. One type of annuity product, the longevity annuity (or advanced
life delayed annuity) begins paying out at age 80 and continues paying until the owner
dies. Unlike other types of annuities, this product does not provide a benefit to heirs if
the owner dies before payout begins (“Ultimate Guide to Retirement”, 2014). The lack of
a death benefit will make this product unacceptable to many investors.
Another product that is being widely touted as a tool in the decumulation strategy
is the reverse mortgage. One criticism of this product is its high fee structure, with some
lenders charging up to 5% of the home’s value (Greene and Tergesen, 2010). Elders
have historically been reluctant to use these tools, due to a desire to leave the house as an
inheritance to surviving family members (Goodfield, 2013). This product may not be a
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viable option for many nearing or currently in the early stages of retirement. Many of the
reverse home mortgages require that a homeowner be a minimum age (62), own the
home or have a very low mortgage balance, and live in the home as the primary
residence. Unlike the previous generation, many in the baby boom generation are retiring
with mortgage debt. Additionally, it is increasingly common for boomers to have credit
card debt. These changing financial circumstances will potentially impact how baby
boomers decumulate, what products are available, which groups can utilize these
products, as well as what products should be developed.
While variables contributing to pattern formation have been identified in this
study, the drawdown strategy cannot be fully understood from this research alone. The
significance of the cycle variable for 2004-2006 illustrates this point. The variable
represents the effects of a period of economic slowdown leading into a recession.
Economic growth was slowing, consumer spending was down, housing stock was
increasing and prices were not appreciating at previous levels (Weller, 2006). Are
households that oversave during this period reacting to declining economic conditions?
Are overspending households simply not adjusting their drawdown strategy to reflect
reduced asset levels? Additional work remains to understand motivations and drivers of
variable significance.
Study results suggest that patterns of decumulation are heterogeneous and factors
predict differently across models. Financial services and insurance companies will need
to take into account variation in spending when designing product offerings and services
as well as shaping spend down patterns. Economists can use these findings to model
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dissaving patterns. Without a national decumulation policy however, the question is what
is the desired pattern of spend down behaviors?
Would it be beneficial for society to have households overspending so that all
potential tax revenue is realized? Is a goal of oversaver best (assuming that health needs
are met and a reasonable quality of life exists)? Oversaving would leave households
precautionary savings to cover future spending shocks, accommodate a bequest motive,
or living longer than projected. However, this could deprive local economies of income
and employment. Is it acceptable for households to transition between categories if the
net effect is an on target drawdown? If on target dissaving is the goal, annuitized wealth
should be a major part of a household’s portfolio. Historically the majority of households
have been reluctant to purchase this product. Should households be encouraged to
purchase annuities? These and other questions will need to be considered if a national
decumulation policy is developed.
Study Limitations
The definition of on target, overspender, or oversaver made an ad hoc choice
regarding tolerance corridor (+/- 10%). It is not clear what size this tolerance should be.
This investigation is the first study to use this classification scheme. Some might argue it
could be smaller or larger. Future studies could model multiple tolerance corridors to
determine the sensitivity of results to corridor specification. Finke, Pfau, and Williams
(2011) suggest that the tolerance should be linked to the household’s overall risk
tolerance.
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Households were categorized as oversavers, overspenders, or on target at each
wave (every two years). Given the overall low financial literacy rates it is possible that
households did not have time to alter their divestment strategy to reflect macroeconomic
changes in the two year period. Use of a different measurement period might yield
different categorizations. However, there is no industry standard for how often to review
plans, suggesting there is no optimal time to assess whether or not a household is meeting
its divestiture goals. For example, Milliman (2009) suggests that once plans are created
they should be reviewed every 3 years or at pre-specified events (personal or market
fluctuations). A 2011 Money Management Institute Report surveyed 14 financial
services firms and found that suggestions for monitoring the plan included annually,
ongoing, unspecified, and proprietary.
This study assessed whether households were predominantly on target,
overspending, or oversaving. Drawdown rates were not compared with an assessment of
income adequacy. Therefore no conclusions can be drawn about actual standards of
living. Result implications are limited to the risk of outliving one’s assets or underconsuming based on the household exhibiting a particular dissaving pattern.
Taking into account market performance during the period under study it is
possible that unexpected gains were experienced by some households therefore
unintentional saving could have occurred. It may be the case that the intended drawdown
strategy was implemented and executed well, however asset balances exceeded
expectations and no alteration to the drawdown plan was made. This could result in a
household being classified as oversaver even though its plan would otherwise have led it
to be classified as on target.
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Finally, the category assignments were based on spend down rates using
remaining life expectancy. The remaining household life expectancy was recalculated at
each wave. We know that a number of those in the sample will live longer than the
average life expectancy. Therefore they should be drawing down at a slower rate than the
average life expectancy would predict. Should they actually exceed life expectancy their
categorization may be inaccurate. While this is a limitation, this study is an improvement
over past research. For example, Sun and Webb (2012) modeled decumulation strategies
using remaining life expectancy at 65; Love and Smith (2007) found that households do
not appear to be spending down assets too quickly relative to remaining life expectancy.
However this determination was conditional only on life expectancy at the onset of the
study; since many elders will outlive life expectancy and life expectancy increases with
each year of survival their findings may not have been accurate.
In spite of the limitations this study has provided useful insights into the
decumulation process and characteristics of households with different drawdown
patterns. Unlike most other studies these patterns reflect realized asset levels and
recalibrated life expectancy calculations tied to survival of household members.
Directions for Future Research
While this study has provided some insight into household characteristics
associated with varying patterns of asset drawdown, the models have low predictive
ability therefore much remains unexplained. Future research in this area should include
qualitative studies designed to ascertain how the dissaving decision is made, how it varies
over time and how it varies across households. There are a vast number of socioeconomic influences to be considered in the decumulation strategy; in addition changes to
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government policies and behavioral factors must be factored into the decision. Curtis
(2006) finds spending goals differ in priority and importance across households.
In addition, we should not assume that the importance of household-specific
variables remains constant across time, nor should we expect that the same set of
variables are influential within a specified household at the time of each unique
decumulation decision. For example, household members may enter retirement planning
to spend time traveling and use assets to pay for leisure activities. After the onset of a
severe disease medical expenses could assume a greater priority over the entertainment
budget. Future studies should explore the dynamics and drivers behind how variables
achieve importance in the decision process and how that prioritization changes over time.
Future quantitative studies should then estimate household spending patterns
based on these qualitative findings. It is common that intentions and actions are not
perfectly aligned (Ajzen, Brown, & Carvajal, 2004).
As discussed in the Results section, coefficients were the same in magnitude for
overspender relative to on target and oversaver relative to on target for some variables. In
an attempt to explain this result the model was re-estimated as a binary logit model,
which indicates whether households were on or off target. Test results confirmed that the
dependent variable classifications used in the multinomial logit regression are statistically
independent therefore the binary logit is not a better fit for the data. This anomaly
remains unexplained and should be the subject of future exploration.
This study demonstrated that dissaving patterns change over time. Many of the
explanatory factors are still to be determined. In an attempt to more fully understand
these patterns future studies might use an alternative parameter for on target. Another
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potential avenue for future research is to test the hypothesis that households do not plan
to spend down all their assets. The inclusion of variables measuring bequest motive
and/or precautionary savings should be considered. An additional area for future
exploration is to study the extent to which households executed their financial plans and
how well the plans performed vis-à-vis the decumulation goals.
The consistency and quality of advice across financial planners is another area of
concern which remains unexplored. A related area for study would be to determine if
there is an association between using an investment adviser and to which category
households are assigned.
There is a body of literature that has posited oversaving is indicative of a bequest
motive however alternative hypotheses bear investigation. The current study has based
spend down rates in part on life expectancy table data. In practice, households are poor at
estimating their remaining life expectancy. It is possible that oversavers were not
intentionally under-depleting; they may have been planning for a longer life expectancy
than was warranted.
It is plausible that oversaving is a result of a poorly designed or nonexistent
dissaving plan. It is also possible that households are not sophisticated enough to manage
assets in a way that provides for excess consumption devoted to leisure activities in the
early retirement years and lower income for diminished consumption in later life. Work
to identify the determinants of oversaving remains.
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Future research should consider whether decumulation patterns change if the
majority of a household’s assets have been annuitized. The expectation is that it would
be easier for households to manage to an on target withdrawal (assuming there is some
amount of non-annuitized asset remaining to handle unforeseen expenses).
In this study categorized household spend down based on reported household
asset levels. Household assets levels were not distinguished by low, middle or high
levels of holdings (similar to Smith, Soto and Penner, 2009). It remains unexplored
whether variables would predict similarly if the asset holdings were modeled as
subsamples.
Finally, this study examined whether or not a household was at risk for outliving
its assets. Outliving your assets by one year versus two decades could have vastly
different consequences for consumption levels and quality of life. Future research should
estimate the remaining life expectancy during which the household would have no assets
to draw from.
Future Policy Direction
The responsibility for managing income and assets in retirement now rests with
the individual household. Those with assets are required to balance drawdown from a
(potentially) complex variety of sources in the context of changing economic and
inflation risk for an estimated twenty to thirty year period. Few households have the
money management skills to do so.
Some households will turn to financial service representatives for advice on
products and decumulation strategies. However, in the words of one retirement industry
channel manager “…while everyone is aware that decumulation is coming – with those
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10,000 or so boomers joining the ranks of Retired America every day – the notion of A.
letting go of those invested funds and B. accurately and helpfully providing retirees with
a steady source of income in retirement … well, they both fail to get much traction in the
industry” (Stonehouse, 2013). Thus, US elders find they are facing this daunting task
largely ill-equipped and with few resources they can trust for advice.
A great deal of policy attention has been focused on accumulation of assets; with
the exception of Minimum Required Distributions there has been little attention on the
decumulation phase. Recent pension reforms may have strengthened the existing system
but defined benefit plans are largely being supplanted by defined contribution plans.
While Social Security benefits are intended to replace a portion of lifetime earnings there
is no overarching national policy citing a specific income replacement goal or an income
floor for the decumulation phase. National efforts to drive a decumulation strategy
appear to be piecemeal at best. With the ever-increasing number of elders entering the
drawdown phase and the evolving retirement environment that they face, an argument
can be made for the creation of a national decumulation policy.
Creation of such a policy is an important step toward guaranteeing income
security for elders. National retirement goals and principles would be explicitly stated,
roles and responsibilities of stakeholders could be clarified, programs and laws can be
created to support the policy, and funding sources identified. Administration of the
policy would also need to be identified. Currently the Department of Labor, Internal
Revenue Service and Securities and Exchange Commission have an oversight role for
particular drawdown components. However it is likely that financial services and life
insurance companies would want to provide input as well. Due to the recent financial
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market scandals there is a high degree of mistrust of institutions and concerns about long
term stability. The role the government, financial services, and insurance companies play
in this process must be carefully considered.
Brown and Nijman (2011) outline a decumulation framework for the Netherlands.
This policy could serve as the basis of discussion for a US decumulation policy. Their
work assumes two targets for wealth annuitization, dependent upon societal preferences.
The first is an inflation-indexed annuity to replace 50% of pre-retirement income. This
solution is intended to provide for basic necessities. For those capable of financing a
higher standard of living an annuity to replace 70% of pre-retirement income would be
the goal. An additional annuity is recommended above and beyond either of these
minimum annuity targets if so desired by the consumer but full annuitization is not
recommended. Lastly, in addition to income minimums, provisions for spousal security
should be made. While Brown and Nijman have created a useful framework to begin the
national discussion there is one area they have not addressed. A provision for financial
literacy training should also be included.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines patterns of decumulation and the role that health events and
marital disruption play in forming those patterns. In addition, the justification for the
creation of a national decumulation policy is presented.
Although this study has highlighted the role of specific factors in determining
decumulation patterns much work remains in this field. Given the changing landscape of
retirement there is no reason to expect that these patterns would not change over time.
A smaller proportion of future retirees will receive pension benefits and their benefit
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levels will be lower relative to current retirees. This change in income will need to be
modeled and understood. The percentage of the aging population that identify as a racial
or ethnic minority is increasing over time; racial variables predicted a different
decumulation pattern from whites. As the US deficit increases and demand for social
welfare programs also increase it is likely that benefit levels and eligibility for Social
Security and Medicare will be revised. Older workers who experience long term
unemployment may be drawing down retirement savings or electing Social Security
earlier than expected to be able to meet their current consumption needs. Along with
health, financial security is a significant predictor of retirement well-being (Leung, Earl;
2012). For these reasons it is necessary to continue to develop our understanding of how
factors influence future decumulation.
We are just beginning to understand how households turn their nest egg into
income streams. Overall findings suggest that how households plan their wealth
decumulation phase, decision making regarding dissaving, plan review and revision, and
how well the plan is executed all merit greater attention. These results have implications
for future retirees and society at large; they suggest that past research has paid too little
attention to the decumulation decision process. As greater numbers of elders move to the
decumulation phase it will become increasingly important to understand the factors
shaping their decisions about dissaving.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE INFLATION FACTOR RESULTS

Table 13.
Variable Inflation Factor Results
Variable
LIFE COURSE
VARIABLES
Marital Status
Married Baseline
Never married Baseline
Divorced Baseline
Widowed Baseline
Children
Spouse/partner in Nursing
Home
Marital disruption
Divorced
Widowed
Health Shock
Respondent Incidence Mild1
Respondent Incidence
Severe2
Spouse Incidence Mild1
Spouse Incidence Severe2
Homeowner
Reached 71
2000-2002
2002-2004
2004-2006
2006-2008
Demographic Variables
Race
White non-Hispanic
Black non-Hispanic
Other non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Age
Female
Educational Attainment
Less than high school
High school

VIF

1/VIF

Reference Group
1.16
1.39
1.98
1.01

Reference Group
0.861981
0.719721
0.504746
0.991734

1.02

0.982080

1.02
1.13

0.983444
0.884897

1.05

0.951108

1.02
1.06
1.06
1.24
2.77
Reference Group
1.46
1.55
2.07

0.984571
0.942321
0.944666
0.809268
0.361180
Reference Group
0.684067
0.643408
0.483382

Reference Group
1.12
1.10
1.24
2.37
1.49

Reference Group
0.889287
0.911731
0.807473
0.421403
0.671315

Reference Group
1.69

Reference Group
0.590631
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Some college
College
Masters

1.58
1.42
1.62

0.632380
0.706679
0.617040

White collar job
Blue collar job
Service job
Missing Sector

2.03
2.13
2.52

0.492051
0.470466
0.397471

Reference Group
1.83
1.93
1.73

Reference Group
0.545115
0.517325
0.578229

1.18

0.846765

1.12
1.99
1.47

0.890256
0.503707
0.681821

1.16
1.26

0.862153
0.792833

1.29
1.08

0.777263
0.922511

1.41
1.55
1.37
1.25

0.710129
0.643708
0.732471
0.801952

Sector

Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Decumulation Factors
Health Capital
Respondent Prevalence
Mild1
Respondent Prevalence
Severe2
Spouse Prevalence Mild1
Spouse Prevalence Severe2
Income
Social Security
Pension Income
Social Security Disability
Income
Income from earnings
Health Insurance
Government Insurance
Employer Insurance
Other Insurance
No insurance

Mean VIF
1.49
Note: n=23,569
1. Mild conditions include high blood pressure, psychiatric problems and arthritis.
2. Severe conditions include diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease and stroke.
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APPENDIX B
MISSING SECTOR SAMPLE ANALYSIS
To analyze potential bias, descriptive statistics for the missing sector cases and the mnl
final sample were run. Results are contained in the table below.
Table 14.
Descriptive Statistics MNL Final Sample and Missing Sector Sample

Variable
Life Course
Variables
Marital Status
Married Baseline
Never married
Baseline
Divorced
Baseline
Widowed
Baseline
Children
Spouse/partner in
Nursing Home
Marital disruption
Divorced
Widowed
Health Shock
Respondent
Incidence Mild*
Respondent
Incidence Severe**
Spouse Incidence
Mild*
Spouse Incidence
Severe**
Homeowner
Reached 71
2000-2002
2002-2004
2004-2006
2006-2008

MNL Final Sample
N=30,100
Mean

Missing Sector Sample
Mean
N

.644

.484

21205

.026

.027

21205

.082

.052

21205

.247
.285

.437
.348

21205
21205

.006

.008

21205

.009
.048

.007
.042

16120
16120

.117

.124

19464

.144

.146

19464

.055

.030

19464

.068
.784
.519
.311
.256
.219
.215

.039
.687
.604
.214
.186
.157
.121

19464
16316
21205
21205
21205
21205
21205
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Demographic
Variables
Race
White non-Hispanic
Black non-Hispanic
Other non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Age
Female
Educational
Attainment
Less than high
school
High school
Some college
College
Masters
Sector
White collar job
Blue collar job
Service job
Missing Sector
Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Decumulation
Factors
Health Capital
Respondent
Prevalence Mild*
Respondent
Prevalence Severe**
Spouse Prevalence
Mild*
Spouse Prevalence
Severe**
Income
Social Security
Pension Income
Social Security
Disability Income

.846
.126
.029
.072
10.463
.621

.845
.130
.025
.078
17.690
.722

21196
21196
21196
21196
21205
21205

.312
.350
.173
.082
.083

.430
.313
.145
.065
.045

21205
21205
21205
21205
21205

.192
.187
.273
.347

N/A
N/A
N/A
1.00

N/A
N/A
N/A
21205

.167
.259
.387
.185

.138
.195
.313
.122

21205
21205
21205
21205

1.358

1.414

16238

.848

.915

16213

.722

.402

21205

.469

.311

21205

.959
.575

.968
.637

21205
21205

.066

.064

21205
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Income from
earnings
.148
.335
21205
Health Insurance
Government
Insurance
.958
.970
16229
Employer Insurance
.359
.282
16037
Other
Insurance
.259
.282
16042
No insurance
.009
.007
21205
Note: n=23,569
* Mild conditions include high blood pressure, psychiatric problems and arthritis.
**Severe conditions include diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease and stroke.
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APPENDIX C
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
A number of sensitivity analyses were performed to test the robustness of my
primary multinomial logistic regression model empirical results. Self-reported health
data were used in this study. Some factors that may influence self-reported health status
are the severity of the disability or health condition, age of the person with the disability,
and the type of activity limitation. Therefore I examined the issue of whether the
multinomial logit results were sensitive to the choice of health measure by estimating two
additional models. The first model used a five-point scale (excellent, very good, good,
fair, and poor) as a measure of self-reported health. Within this sample a change of 2
points between waves (for example, from excellent at baseline to good at wave 2) was
observed for greater than 5% of respondents thus it is considered a negative change in
health status. A dummy variable Self-Reported Health was created where 1=2 point
decline in health status 0=otherwise.
The second model used a measure of functional status based on the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services RAI 3.0 manual, v1.09. The onset of Activities of Daily
Living (ADLs) (baseline=0 ADLS reported to ADLs=1 at any wave) or an increase of 2
or more ADLs between waves (for example, Wave 3 ADLs=2, Wave 4 ADLs=4) were
both used as indicators of a negative change to health. A dummy variable ADLs was
coded 1=onset of ADL or increase of 2+ ADLs between waves, 0=otherwise. Due to
differences in how the chronic conditions, ADL, and the count of mild and severe
condition questions are asked of respondents sample sizes will differ. For example, in the
primary analysis respondents are asked if a doctor has ever told the respondent s/he has a
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particular health condition. These questions are more likely to have missing data because
they are more complex to respond to than the ADL and self-reported health measures.
The questions for mild and severe conditions can be interpreted by respondents as to
whether or not s/he has the condition at the time of the interview. If a condition is being
treated and under control, the condition may not be reported (RAND, 2010). Results are
found in tables 15 and 16 below.
A review of the self-reported health results indicates very minor changes to
significance within the marital status and disruption groupings. Within the oversaver
outcome, reporting being divorced at baseline was no longer a predictor. The
demographic variables predicted similarly to the fully-specified MNL logit regression.
The sole change to decumulation factors was that income from pension is now significant
for oversaver. The pseudo R-squared value for this model is comparable to the MNL
logit (0.0105). However, a direct comparison of it with the multinomial logistic
regression should not be made due to the different sample sizes.

Table 15.
Empirical Results for Self-Reported Health Sensitivity Analysis

Variables
Life Course Variables
Marital Status
Married Baseline
Never married Baseline
Divorced
Baseline
Widowed
Baseline
Children

Overspender
RRR
95% CI

RRR

Oversaver
95% CI

Reference
Group
.74

Reference
Group
.56 - .99*

Reference
Group
.79

Reference
Group
.62 – 1.01

1.20

1.00 – 1.45

1.14

.95 – 1.37

1.18
1.00

1.03 – 1.34*
.93 – 1.06

1.10
1.02

.97 – 1.24
.95 – 1.09
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.93

.56 – 1.54

.98

.61 – 1.56

.80
1.18
1.10
1.02
Reference
Group

.85
1.10
1.22
.91
Reference
Group

.59 – 1.23
.90 – 1.34
1.09 – 1.37**
.81 – 1.03
Reference
Group

1.20
.97
1.03

.56 – 1.16
.97 – 1.45
.97 – 1.24
.90 – 1.16
Reference
Group
1.07 –
1.34**
.87 – 1.09
.90 – 1.19

1.03
.96
.92

.92 – 1.15
.86 – 1.08
.80 – 1.06

Reference
Group
.63
1.11
.51
1.00
1.09

Reference
Group
.54 - .73**
.82 – 1.51
.41 - .62**
.99 – 1.01
.98 – 1.22

Reference
Group
.63
.98
.52
1.02
1.03

Reference
Group
.55 - .74**
.73 – 1.33
.43 - .65**
1.01 – 1.03**
.93 – 1.14

Reference
Group
.95
.94
.93
.90

Reference
Group
.84 – 1.08
.81 – 1.09
.78 – 1.23
.74 – 1.10

Reference
Group
1.03
1.02
1.05
1.09

Reference
Group
.91 – 1.15
.89 – 1.18
.89 – 1.26
.90 – 1.31

White collar job

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

Blue collar job

1.30

1.27

1.09 – 1.49**

Service job
Missing Sector

1.23
1.16

Reference
Group
1.11 –
1.54**
1.06 –
1.43**
1.00 – 1.35

1.21
1.20

1.05 – 1.39**
1.41 – 1.38*

Reference
Group
.96
1.00
1.05

Reference
Group
.83 – 1.11
.87 – 1.15
.89 – 1.23

Reference
Group
.96
.96
1.08

Reference
Group
.83 – 1.09
.84 – 1.10
.93 – 1.26

1.11

.92 – 1.33

1.01

.84 – 1.21

Spouse/partner in
Nursing Home
Marital disruption
Divorced
Widowed
Homeowner
Reached 71
2000-2002
2002-2004
2004-2006
2006-2008
Demographic Variables
Race
White non-Hispanic
Black non-Hispanic
Other non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Age
Female
Educational Attainment
Less than high school
High school
Some college
College
Masters
Sector

Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Decumulation Factors
Self-Reported Health
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Income
Social Security
Pension Income
Social Security Disability
Income

1.18
.85

.94 – 1.48
.77 - .94**

1.19
.91

.97 – 1.47
.83 – 1.00*

.51

.52

.43 - .63**

Income from earnings
Health Insurance
Government Insurance
Employer Insurance
Other
Insurance
No insurance

1.27

.42 - .62**
1.14 –
1.42**

1.27

1.14 – 1.42**

1.02
1.03

.78 – 1.33
.92 – 1.15

1.03
1.07

.80 – 1.33
.96 – 1.18

1.00
1.09

.89 – 1.12
.62 – 1.88

1.03
.89

.92 – 1.15
.52 – 1.52

Pseudo R2
0.0106
Note: n=28,659
Note: RRR=Relative Risk Ratio, CI=Confidence Interval
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
The ADL sensitivity analysis shows a similar pattern of changes to significance
for the life course variables. Here again we find that changes to significance are found
within the marital status and disruption groupings. Widowed at baseline achieved
significance for households in the overspender outcome, whereas experiencing
widowhood over the study was no longer significant. Within the oversaver outcome,
reporting being divorced at baseline was no longer a predictor. The age demographic
variable is now significant for overspender. Further mirroring the self-reported health
results we see that the sole change to decumulation factors was that income from pension
is now significant for oversaver. The pseudo R-squared value for this model is
comparable to the MNL logit (0.0105). Again, due to sample size variations a
comparison to the multinomial logistic regression model is not valid.
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Table 16.
Empirical Results for ADLs Sensitivity Analysis

Variables
Life Course Variables
Marital Status
Married Baseline
Never married Baseline
Divorced
Baseline
Widowed
Baseline
Children
Spouse/partner in
Nursing Home
Marital disruption
Divorced
Widowed
Homeowner
Reached 71
2000-2002
2002-2004
2004-2006
2006-2008
Demographic Variables
Race
White non-Hispanic
Black non-Hispanic
Other non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Age
Female
Educational Attainment
Less than high school
High school
Some college
College
Masters

Overspender
RRR
95% CI

RRR

Oversaver
95% CI

Reference
Group
.75

Reference
Group
.56 – 1.00

Reference
Group
.79

Reference
Group
.62 – 1.01

1.20

1.00 – 1.45

1.14

.95 – 1.37

1.18
1.00

1.03 – 1.33*
.93 – 1.06

1.10
1.02

.97 – 1.24
.95 – 1.09

.93

.56 – 1.53

.98

.61 – 1.56

.81
1.18
1.10
1.02
Reference
Group

.85
1.10
1.22
.91
Reference
Group

.59 – 1.23
.90 – 1.34
1.09 – 1.37**
.81 – 1.03
Reference
Group

1.20
.97
1.03

.56 – 1.16
.97 – 1.45
.98 – 1.24
.90 – 1.15
Reference
Group
1.08 –
1.34**
.97 – 1.09
.90 – 1.19

1.03
.96
.92

.92 – 1.15
.86 – 1.08
.80 – 1.06

Reference
Group
.63
1.11
.51
1.00
1.09

Reference
Group
.53 - .73**
.82 – 1.51
.41 - .63**
.99 – 1.01
.98 – 1.22

Reference
Group
.63
.98
.52
1.02
1.03

Reference
Group
.55 - .74**
.73 – 1.33
.43 - .65**
1.01 – 1.03
.93 – 1.14

Reference
Group
.95
.94
.94
.90

Reference
Group
.85 – 1.08
.81 – 1.09
.78 – 1.13
.74 – 1.10

Reference
Group
1.03
1.02
1.05
1.09

Reference
Group
.91 – 1.15
.89 – 1.18
.88 – 1.26
.90 – 1.31
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Sector
White collar job

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

1.28

1.09 – 1.49**

1.23
1.16

Reference
Group
1.11 –
1.54**
1.06 –
1.43**
1.00 – 1.35

Blue collar job

1.31

Service job
Missing Sector

1.20
1.20

1.05 – 1.39*
1.04 – 1.38*

Reference
Group
.96
1.00
1.05

Reference
Group
.83 – 1.10
.87 – 1.15
.89 – 1.24

Reference
Group
.96
.96
1.08

Reference
Group
.83 – 1.09
.84 – 1.10
.93 – 1.26

1.09

.96 – 1.24

1.00

.88 – 1.13

1.18
.85

.94 – 1.48
.77 - .93**

1.19
.91

.97 – 1.47
.83 – 1.0*

.51

.53

.43 - .63**

1.27

.42 - .61**
1.14 –
1.42**

1.27

1.14 – 1.42**

1.02
1.04

.78 – 1.33
.93 – 1.16

1.03
1.07

.80 – 1.33
.96 – 1.18

1.00
1.09

.90 – 1.12
.63 – 1.89

1.03
.89

.92 – 1.15
.52 – 1.52

Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Decumulation Factors
ADLs
Income
Social Security
Pension Income
Social Security Disability
Income
Income from earnings
Health Insurance
Government Insurance
Employer Insurance
Other
Insurance
No insurance

Pseudo R2
0.0106
Note: n=28,659
Note: RRR=Relative Risk Ratio, CI=Confidence Interval
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
Economic Cycle Effects
Economists typically study patterns of economic activity bounded by the same
phase of the business cycle (i.e. peak to peak or trough to trough). Therefore I tested an
alternative assumption of the economic cycle by specifying the model over a period with
different economic stages (2000-2006/peak to peak) from those in the primary study
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(1998-2008/peak to trough). 1998-2000 (cycle 1) was excluded from the model since it
is no longer within the period under study. 2000-2002 (cycle 2) is the omitted reference
group. 2006-2008 is excluded from the model as well since it is not within the period
being analyzed. Results are in table 17.
Changes to life course variables are reported only for the overspender outcome;
divorced at baseline is now significant while experiencing widowhood no longer predicts.
Demographic results show being Hispanic now predicts overspender. Within the longest
held occupation sector, having held a blue collar job lost its predictive ability for
oversaver, service sector fails to predict either overspender or oversaver, and missing
sector is significant for overspender. Living in the Midwest relative to Northeast is now
significant for both overspender and oversaver. Finally, income from earnings no longer
predicts for oversaver while employer insurance attained significance. There were no
changes to decumulation factors predicting overspender. Due to sample size difference
(23,569 vs. 16,233) I cannot state whether the multinomial logit regression or the model
below is superior in fitting the outcome data.
Table 17.
Empirical Results for 2000 – 2006 Sensitivity Analysis

Variables
Life Course Variables
Marital Status
Married Baseline
Never married Baseline
Divorced
Baseline
Widowed
Baseline
Children

Overspender
RRR
95% CI

Oversaver
RRR
95% CI

Reference
Group
.84

Reference
Group
.58 - .122

Reference
Group
1.01

Reference
Group
.73 – 1.39

1.35

1.04 – 1.75*

1.37

1.06 – 1.77*

1.11
1.03

.92 – 1.35
.94 – 1.13

1.10
1.07

.92 – 1.33
.98 – 1.17
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1.61

.76 – 3.41

1.48

.72 – 3.07

.98
1.23

.57 – 1.68
.93 – 1.64

.93
1.16

.55 – 1.58
.87 – 1.54

1.09

.92 – 1.29

.90

.76 – 1.07

1.06
1.06
.84
1.09
1.10
Reference
Group
1.12
.89

.92 – 1.22
.84 – 1.34
.70 – 1.00
.94 – 1.27
.92 – 1.33
Reference
Group
.94 - 1.33
.74 – 1.08

1.10
1.01
.93
1.18
1.07
Reference
Group
1.01
.93

.95 – 1.27
.80 – 1.28
.78 – 1.11
1.03 – 1.36*
.89 – 1.28
Reference
Group
.85 – 1.20
.77 – 1.12

Reference
Group
.63
1.23
.50
.99
1.06

Reference
Group
.52 - .75**
.85 – 1.78
.38 - .64**
.98 – 1.01
.92 – 1.23

Reference
Group
.65
1.04
.57
1.01
1.00

Reference
Group
.55 - .78**
.72 – 1.50
.44 - .73**
1.00 – 1.03
.87 – 1.16

Reference
Group
.89
.95
.80
.81

Reference
Group
.76 – 1.04
.78 – 1.15
.63 – 1.01
.63 – 1.04

Reference
Group
.96
.98
.85
.92

Reference
Group
.82 – 1.11
.81 – 1.17
.68 – 1.07
.73 – 1.17

White collar job
Blue collar job
Service job
Missing Sector

Reference
Group
1.26
1.17
1.22

Reference
Group
1.02 – 1.55*
.97 – 1.41
1.01 – 1.48*

Reference
Group
1.21
1.16
1.25

Reference
Group
1.00 – 1.48
.98 – 1.38
1.04 – 1.50*

Northeast
Midwest
South
West

Reference
Group
.74
.92
.94

Reference
Group
.62 - .89**
.77 – 1.09
.76 – 1.15

Reference
Group
.79
.94
.95

Reference
Group
.66 - .94**
.79 – 1.12
.78 – 1.15

Spouse/partner in
Nursing Home
Marital disruption
Divorced
Widowed
Health Shock
Respondent Incidence
Mild1
Respondent Incidence
Severe2
Spouse Incidence Mild1
Spouse Incidence Severe2
Homeowner
Reached 71
2000-2002
2002-2004
2004-2006
Demographic Variables
Race
White non-Hispanic
Black non-Hispanic
Other non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Age
Female
Educational Attainment
Less than high school
High school
Some college
College
Masters
Sector

Region

134

Decumulation Factors
Health Capital
Respondent Prevalence
Mild1
Respondent Prevalence
Severe2
Spouse Prevalence Mild1
Spouse Prevalence
Severe2
Income
Social Security
Pension Income
Social Security Disability
Income
Income from earnings
Health Insurance
Government Insurance
Employer Insurance
Other
Insurance
No insurance

1.04

.96 – 1.11

1.01

.94 – 1.08

1.04
.97

.97 – 1.11
.89 – 1.06

1.03
.98

.97 – 1.10
.90 – 1.07

.98

.91 – 1.07

1.02

.94 – 1.10

1.06
.83

.77 – 1.45
.73 - .94**

.95
.90

.71 – 1.27
.80 – 1.02

.48
1.24

.38 - .62**
1.04 – 1.48*

.47
1.28

.37 - .60**
1.08 – 1.52

1.03
1.10

.61 – 1.75
.95 – 1.27

1.02
1.18

.61 – 1.71
1.03 – 1.35*

1.01
.89

.87 – 1.18
.36 – 2.24

1.04
.68

.90 – 1.20
.27 – 1.68

Pseudo R2
0.0105
Note: n=16,233
Note: RRR=Relative Risk Ratio, CI=Confidence Interval
1. Mild conditions include high blood pressure, psychiatric problems and arthritis.
2. Severe conditions include diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease and stroke.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01

Life Expectancy Analysis
Studies indicate that households plan for their expected longevity. Household
time preferences for consumption were tested by including a life expectancy variable in
the model. Beginning in 2000, respondents were asked the probability that they would
live 10 or more additional years. The longevity expectation variable was coded 1=expect
to live 10 or more years 0=otherwise. Since the question was not asked in 1998, this
resulted in fewer cases available for analysis. Therefore a missing variable (missing
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longevity expectation) was created for those households that did not provide data for the
additional life expectancy question.
Inclusion of this variable had a small effect on model results. Homeownership
achieved significance in predicting an increased risk for overspender relative to on target,
however the coefficient was the same as the MNL model. The longevity expectation
variable did not achieve significance. The missing longevity expectation variable did not
predict significantly for either overspender or oversaver relative to on target. All other
variables which were significant predictors in the MNL model continued to predict in the
revised model, and coefficient magnitude remained the same with two exceptions. There
was a very small increase to the coefficient for Social Security Disability income for the
oversaver category (.52 to .53) and a slight decrease to the coefficient for Hispanic in the
overspender category (.52 to .51).
The pseudo r-squared (0.0107) is higher than that of the MNL logit regression,
indicating it is a modest improvement over the MNL regression. Results are reported in
table 18.
Table 18.
Empirical Results for Longevity Sensitivity Analysis

Variables
Life Course Variables
Marital Status
Married Baseline
Never married Baseline
Divorced
Baseline
Widowed
Baseline
Children

Overspender
RRR
95% CI

Oversaver
RRR
95% CI

Reference
Group
.78

Reference
Group
.56 – 1.07

Reference
Group
.81

Reference
Group
.62 – 1.06

1.23

1.00 – 1.52

1.24

1.01 – 1.52*

1.10
1.00

.93 – 1.29
.93 – 1.07

1.05
1.02

.90 – 1.23
.95 – 1.09
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.86

.50 – 1.48

.88

.53 – 1.48

.94
1.26

.61 – 1.43
1.00 – 1.59

.84
1.14

.55 – 1.29
.91 – 1.43

1.04

.90 – 1.20

.92

.80 – 1.06

1.06
1.03
.89
1.14
1.07
Reference
Group

1.07
.96
.93
1.22
.99
Reference
Group

.95 – 1.20
.79 – 1.15
.80 – 1.09
1.08 – 1.38**
.85 – 1.14
Reference
Group

1.19
.95
1.04

.94 – 1.19
.85 – 1.25
.76 – 1.04
1.00 – 1.29*
.92 – 1.24
Reference
Group
1.05 –
1.34**
.84 – 1.08
.90 – 1.20

1.00
.93
.94

.89 – 1.13
.82 – 1.05
.81 – 1.08

Reference
Group
.62
1.09
.51
1.00
1.13

Reference
Group
.53 - .73**
.78 – 1.50
.41 - .64**
.99 – 1.01
1.00 – 1.27

Reference
Group
.64
.97
.56
1.02
1.05

Reference
Group
.54 - .74**
.71 – 1.33
.45 - .70**
1.01 – 1.03**
.93 – 1.18

Reference
Group
.93
.95
.89
.84

Reference
Group
.81– 1.06
.81– 1.11
.73– 1.09
.68– 1.05

Reference
Group
1.01
1.02
1.01
1.01

Reference
Group
.89 – 1.14
.88 – 1.19
.84 – 1.23
.83 – 1.23

White collar job

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

Reference
Group

Blue collar job
Service job
Missing Sector

1.29
1.19
1.15

Reference
Group
1.08 –
1.55**
1.01– 1.39*
.98 – 1.36

1.25
1.18
1.21

1.06 – 1.49**
1.01 – 1.37*
1.04 – 1.41*

Spouse/partner in
Nursing Home
Marital disruption
Divorced
Widowed
Health Shock
Respondent Incidence
Mild1
Respondent Incidence
Severe2
Spouse Incidence Mild1
Spouse Incidence Severe2
Homeowner
Reached 71
2000-2002
2002-2004
2004-2006
2006-2008
Demographic Variables
Race
White non-Hispanic
Black non-Hispanic
Other non-Hispanic
Hispanic
Age
Female
Educational Attainment
Less than high school
High school
Some college
College
Masters
Sector
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Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Decumulation Factors
Health Capital
Respondent Prevalence
Mild1
Respondent Prevalence
Severe2
Spouse Prevalence Mild1
Spouse Prevalence
Severe2
Income
Social Security
Pension Income
Social Security Disability
Income

Reference
Group
.91
.98
1.03

Reference
Group
.78 – 1.06
.84– 1.13
.87– 1.23

Reference
Group
.95
.97
1.03

Reference
Group
.82 – 1.10
.84 – 1.11
.88 – 1.22

1.04

.98 – 1.11

1.02

.96 – 1.09

1.04
1.01

.98 – 1.10
.94 – 1.09

1.05
1.00

.99 – 1.10
.93 – 1.07

.97

.90 – 1.04

.99

.93 – 1.06

1.19
.89

.94 – 1.50
.80 - .99*

1.18
.96

.95 – 1.47
.87 – 1.06

.50

.41 - .62**
1.11 –
1.48**

.53

.43 - .64**

Income from earnings
1.28
1.35
1.17 – 1.56**
Health Insurance
Government Insurance
1.04
.80 – 1.37
1.05
.80 – 1.37
Employer Insurance
1.03
.91 – 1.16
1.08
.97 – 1.22
Other
Insurance
1.00
.88 – 1.14
1.04
.93 – 1.18
No insurance
1.46
.80 – 2.68
1.16
.65 – 2.07
Longevity Expectation
1.00
1.00 – 1.00
1.00
1.00 – 1.00
Missing Longevity
Expectation
1.04
.89 – 1.20
.99
.85 – 1.14
2
Pseudo R
0.0107
Note: n=23,569
Note: RRR=Relative Risk Ratio, CI=Confidence Interval
1. Mild conditions include high blood pressure, psychiatric problems and arthritis.
2. Severe conditions include diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease and stroke.
*p<0.05, **p<0.01
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